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“There are currently about 2.75 million Palestinians living under military occupation in the West Bank, most of them in Areas A and B 40 percent of the West Bank where they have
limited autonomy. They are restricted in their daily movements by a web of checkpoints and unable to travel into or out
of the West Bank without a permit from the Israelis. So if there
is only one state, you would have millions of Palestinians permanently living in segregated enclaves in the middle of the
West Bank, with no real political rights, separate legal, education and transportation systems, vast income disparities, under a permanent military occupation that deprives them of the
most basic freedoms. Separate and unequal is what you would
have. And nobody can explain how that works. Would an Israeli accept living that way? Would an American accept living
that way? Will the world accept it?”

John Kerry, 28 December 20161
INTRODUCTION

R

oute 5 begins at the Mediterranean coast, north of Tel
Aviv, and journeys east through the Sharon Plain and toward the Jordan Valley. The scenery rapidly transforms from
the affluent villas and dense apartment blocks of Ramat HaSharon and Petah Tikva to the arid, rolling hills that mark entry
into the West Bank. The road is well-traveled by many who live
in the growing communities outside of Israel’s commercial and
1. Speech by John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Middle East
Peace (Dec. 28, 2016), available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm.
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economic core and who use the highway for direct access into and
from the city.
Continue east, twelve miles past the Green Line, and one arrives in Ariel. This large Israeli settlement is located in the heart
of the West Bank. To many, the appeal of Ariel echoes that of the
North American suburb. Its residents typically prioritize space
and affordability above increasingly expensive urban lifestyles.
The ostensible normality of daily life in Ariel is convoluted. Despite its proximity to Tel Aviv, Ariel was developed on occupied
territory. It has since grown into one of the largest Israeli settlements in the West Bank.2 Most often, its residents do not evoke
the image of the nationalist settler, whose ideological commitment to a Greater Israel is unwavering. Yet, its presence, beyond
the Green Line, places Ariel near the geographic and symbolic
center of the land Palestinians claim for a future state, which
some Israeli leaders view as integral to their own, and which the
international community recognizes as under belligerent occupation.3
Accordingly, in Ariel and throughout Israel’s many West Bank
settlements, the mundanities of daily life and local affairs can
arouse global interest and ignite regional tension. Yet, Ariel remains a city, otherwise conventional. An Israeli can work, buy a
home, attend university, and enjoy the comforts of a suburban
life. While its legal status as a settlement, in violation of international law, has negligible influence on the daily routines of its
residents, it is a primary facet of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It is a space that embodies a prolonged occupation, where legal
narratives unfold and bear witness to competing uses of international law.
Settlements like Ariel present a paradox. Their existence, and
the normality of daily life within, repudiates the very legal
framework that is intended to govern the conflict and enable its

2. GERSHON SHAFIR, A HALF CENTURY OF OCCUPATION: ISRAEL, PALESTINE,
1, 188 90 (2017).
3. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 3 (Mar. 22, 1979). See also G.A. Res. 32/20, ¶ 1
(Nov. 25 1977) (affirming that Israel’s presence within the West Bank constitutes a belligerent occupation). See also Grant T. Harris, Human Rights, Israel,
and the Political Realities of Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 87, 94 95 (2008).
AND THE WORLD’S MOST INTRACTABLE CONFLICT
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resolution. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank has now surpassed its fiftieth year.4 As the conflict’s landscape becomes increasingly legalized, agreement as to how international law may
effectively govern prolonged occupation eludes consensus. Traditionally, occupation is understood as a neutral phenomenon.
Military control of foreign territory operationalizes the occupation framework that is, the various legal instruments that regulate occupation.5 The framework’s application is commonly understood as a counteraction to the factual recognition of foreign
control.6 As prominently interpreted, international law’s relationship with occupation is devoid of normative content.7
Eyal Benvenisti explains that the drafters of the legal framework regulating occupation “took pains to emphasize that the
regime of occupation is a de facto regime that conveys to the occupant only circumscribed rights and obligations for the limited
duration of the occupation.”8 The resulting legal treatment is
premised upon the assumption that foreign control is temporary.9 Although occupation was envisioned in brief intervals and
4. The occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip
(as well as other territories) began in June 1967. See generally IDITH ZERTAL &
AKIVA ELDAR, LORDS OF THE LAND: THE WAR OVER ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENTS IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, 1967 2007 (2007).
5. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention
(IV)]. The term occupation framework includes treaty-based provisions, primarily the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as
the various interpretations that have evolved around these. See also Yutaka
Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation: Critical Examinations of the
Historical Development of the Law of Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 51
(2012) (For an overview of the occupation framework’s historical development)
[hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation].
6. See Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 211
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003). See also Marco
Sassòli, The Concept of Belligerent Occupation, in THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1390, 1393 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta &
Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).
7. AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 4 (2017) [hereinafter GROSS, WRITING ON
THE WALL].
8. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 15 16 (2d ed. 2012) (Benvenisti notes that, “as part of the jus in
bello, the lawfulness of the occupation regime or its authorities did not depend
on the jus ad bellum issues that led to the invasion and the occupation.”).
9. Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 721, 726 (2005).
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regulated accordingly, the legal framework does not set firm durational requirements. Instead, it protects the inalienability of
sovereignty. It strictly regulates the occupying power’s ability to
alter the territory’s legal or political status. Thus, the legal
framework is structurally conservationist.10
Prolonged occupation presents myriad challenges. These emanate from the occupation’s extended duration. They derive from
the structural inability of the occupation framework to provide
more than temporary consideration to a population that faces
extended subjugation. The framework’s ephemeral conception of
occupation is ill-suited to regulate the enduring needs of a population bereft of self-governance. This incompatibility between
international law’s conservationist orientation and the reality of
prolonged occupation has long provoked questions regarding the
appropriateness of the legal framework.11 Throughout the West
Bank, a legal regime that is understood as exceptional and temporal continues to regulate an occupation that has now exceeded
a half-century in duration. International law is persistently employed to govern a fait accompli evidenced by the prevailing
normality of life in the settlements whose continuation is partially facilitated by appeals to international law.
As an occupation’s length increases, year-by-year, its challenges become further embedded and the associated framework
further exposed. Most commonly, responses to these challenges
are grounded within an interpretative approach that favors a
factual or non-normative understanding of occupation.12 This
prominent reading recognizes a temporary conception of occupation, but accepts that the framework’s application is not disrupted by duration. Although international humanitarian law
(IHL) envisions occupation as a temporary state, both in accordance with its historical origins and as a requisite means of preserving sovereignty, the prominent interpretative approach ac-

10. Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 199
(2005).
11. See generally Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 47 (1990) [hereinafter Roberts, Prolonged Occupation].
12. See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 28 29 (2004) [hereinafter U.K. Military Manual]. See also Kristen E.
Boon, The Future of the Law of Occupation, 46 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 107, 116
(2008).
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centuates the legal framework’s absence of a durational limitation. The resulting de-emphasis of the framework’s innate temporality projects a conception of IHL that is constrained in its
treatment of prolonged occupation. Temporariness, when juxtaposed with the framework’s lax durational requirements, becomes intangible. It becomes a concept devoid of meaning or precision.13
Occupation is undesirable. Factually conceived and legally
acknowledged, occupation is regulated because it is an inherent
characteristic of war. Yet when an occupation becomes prolonged, it is less likely to serve a necessary military need. The
means and character of the occupation alters. The interests of
the occupying power depart from the purpose of the occupation
framework. Commonly, however, the legal treatment of occupation does not respond to the altered form of foreign control. It
continues to regulate a situation that threatens permanence
through a legal framework that provides provisional respite. As
prominently interpreted, it fails to articulate a clear legal basis
as to why occupation, despite its undesirability, must be terminated.
Prolonged occupation should not be exclusively defined by an
occupation’s duration. The principle of temporality is not only
contingent upon the passage of time. It is also illustrative of the
conditions that exist and the form that the occupation has assumed. An occupation will become prolonged when it shifts from
a regulated phase that preserves sovereignty and ensures uninterrupted humanitarian consideration to a form of foreign control that threatens to become permanent. By adopting a non-normative interpretation of occupation and fixating on the challenges that stem from an occupation’s duration, the legal framework engages with the daily administration of the occupation
but neglects the fundamental purposes of this legal regime.
This article explores international law’s efficacy. Attempts to
remedy the challenges emanating from the occupation framework’s inapposite relationship with prolonged occupation result
from an interpretative choice. This is between the prominent,
non-normative reading of the occupation framework, which re13. The Hague Regulations did not consider the likelihood of a prolonged
occupation and operated under the assumption that a peace treaty between the
occupying power and the occupied government would be expedited. See
BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 144 45.
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sponds to the challenges caused by a prolonged occupation’s duration, and a normative approach that wishes to engage with the
causes of this altered form of foreign control. Corresponding efforts may be both benevolent and necessary. Yet, when grounded
within the prominent interpretative approach, responses to prolonged occupation are limited. In accordance with this interpretative approach, the user seeks to better employ the law. The
prominent interpretation purports to more effectively regulate
the occupying power’s ability to respond to the challenges of prolonged occupation. Additionally, however, these efforts provide
the occupying power with an opportunity to justify initiatives
that entrench its control. Ostensibly, these are presented as
compensating for the occupation framework’s incomplete conception of occupation.
The following pages trace and engage with debates concerning
the legal regulation of prolonged occupation. They query how the
prominent, non-normative interpretation of the occupation
framework influences or enables responses to the challenges
posed by prolonged occupation. Though these challenges evoke a
diverse array of responses, this article identifies a commonality.
Collectively, responses premised upon a non-normative interpretation of the occupation framework are limited by an understanding of international law that only allows efforts promoting
the better management of occupation. Whether the manager’ is
attempting to externally address the challenges presented by
prolonged occupation or internally operate within the framework’s confines, this management approach is motivated by an
unconstrained notion of occupation. It neglects the occupying
power’s intentions. Ignoring the new form of control that the prolonged occupation establishes, the user seeks to better engage
with various provisions of the legal framework to mitigate the
results, but not the cause, of prolonged occupation.
What is characterized here as the management approach is derived from a non-normative interpretation of the occupation
framework. It refers to the diverse and preferred methods of regulating prolonged occupation. Commonly, the management approach is prioritized by state actors, courts, and international
lawyers. It accompanies a shift from a formal occupation, premised in necessity and based on temporality, to a quasi-permanent
administrative relationship. Various actors, each with distinct
motivations, apply the management approach in several forms.
An occupying power or an international actor may appeal to this
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approach to justify a benevolent policy intended to serve the occupied population.14 The occupying power may also appeal to the
management approach to legitimize measures that fortify its
control of, or interests in, the occupied territory. This approach,
however, derives from an interpretation of the legal framework
that accentuates occupation’s factual character and lax temporal
requirements. Upon an interpretation that accepts the framework’s application, and neglects a holistic conception of temporality, management becomes either the only or the preferred
method of addressing prolonged occupation.
This article begins from the assumption that in 1967, following
war between Israel and neighboring Arab states, the West Bank,
East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the
Golan Heights came under Israeli control.15 These events triggered the application of the occupation framework. The following
sections, however, do not directly address the occupation or legal
status of the Gaza Strip. This omission is not a commentary on
Gaza’s post-disengagement status. Neither, is it an assertion
that there is a legal or political distinction between Gaza and the
West Bank.16 The focus of this article is on the legal framework
governing instances of prolonged occupation. Gaza cannot be ignored within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But
to understand the implications and inadequacies of the occupation framework for the purpose of governing prolonged occupation, this article limits its observations to the West Bank. It is

14. JAMES PETTIFER & MIRANDA VICKERS, THE ALBANIAN QUESTION:
RESHAPING THE BALKANS 236 (2007).
15. See generally MICHAEL B. OREN, SIX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (2003).
16. Following Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in
2005, there has been significant debate as to whether Gaza remains under formal Israeli occupation. In 2008, the Israeli Supreme Court held in Bassiouni
that Gaza, following Israel’s disengagement, was no longer occupied (though it
held that Israel still owed limited humanitarian duties to the Gazan population). See HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister (2008) (Isr.). For
a variety of views on Gaza’s status, see Geoffrey Aronson, Issues Arising from
the Implementation of Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza Strip, 34 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 49 (2004-2005); Elizabeth Samson, Is Gaza Occupied? Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 915
(2010); Marko Milanovic, Is Gaza Still Occupied by Israel?, EJIL: TALK! (Mar.
1 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-gaza-still-occupied-by-israel/; Yuval Shany,
Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza After Israel’s Disengagement, 8
Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 369 (2006).
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here that the Israeli presence is greatest and most entrenched.17
Extensive settlement developments mark the West Bank and
continue to expand.18 Again, this does not suggest that Gaza
holds a separate territorial status, but instead recognizes that
the issues regarding the current occupation of Gaza are less concerned with the particular challenges presented by prolonged occupation.
The following considers how international law is employed in
response to and in furtherance of prolonged occupation. Part I
provides a brief overview of the occupation framework. It reviews the well-established challenges that manifest during prolonged occupation. This begins with the pioneering work of
Adam Roberts and describes how, due to the occupation framework’s conservationist structure, prolonged occupation is understood to require particular forms of administration.
Part II traces the implications of these responses. It queries
how the prominent, non-normative interpretation influences the
regulation of prolonged occupation. This section demonstrates
that widespread appeals to the occupation framework, as traditionally conceived, facilitate continued recourse to the management approach. Set within the West Bank, this section assesses
state engagements, juridical interventions, and scholarly debates. Though the desire to better manage a prolonged occupation may be compelling, this section demonstrates how perpetual
management threatens to entrench occupation and forsake the
requirement of temporality.
Part III considers alternative interpretations of the occupation
framework. These reject the prominent, non-normative readings
that permeate much of the discourse. They increasingly feature
within debates regarding the effective legal treatment of prolonged occupation and raise important questions regarding the
legal status of this form of occupation.
Finally, Part IV offers a third interpretative approach. Drawing upon identified sources of international law, this article proposes a novel, normative interpretation of the occupation framework. This accentuates the requirement of temporality. Conceived holistically, this interpretation considers not only the
17. See generally GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL
THE BIRTH OF THE SETTLEMENTS 1967 1977 (2006). [hereinafter
GORENBERG, ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE].
18. See generally YEHEZKEL LEIN & EYAL WEIZMAN, LAND GRAB: ISRAEL’S
SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST BANK (Yael Stein ed., 2002).
AND
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length of an occupation, but also the form that an occupation has
assumed. Engagements with the framework, responses to the
challenges presented by prolonged occupation, may pivot from a
limiting interpretative approach that professes neutrality and
emphasizes durational neglect. This will nurture attempts to
end, not simply manage or better endure, prolonged occupation.
The proposed interpretative approach will require an occupying
power to satisfy a good faith obligation to refrain from actions
that facilitate or perpetuate occupation. Once an occupation can
no longer be justified as a temporary necessity that preserves
sovereignty and provides humanitarian consideration, it abandons its legal purpose and must terminate. The proposed interpretative approach is more consistent with the spirit of IHL. It
better matches the ethos of the occupation framework. And it
will better align the purpose of the occupation framework with
diplomatic and state-building initiatives that are grounded in
the principle of self-determination.
Identifying the motive of management as a causal factor, this
article argues that common responses to prolonged occupation
may be necessary, but when taken within the occupation framework’s traditional, non-normative confines, they risk perpetuating occupation. They entrench a legal framework that is understood to neglect duration and curtail the requirement of temporality. This interpretation of the occupation framework becomes
susceptible to manipulation. The proposed approach, offered
here, shifts the interpretative focus of the occupation framework. It emphasizes a temporary conception of occupation and
facilitates efforts to end the occupation. This is not a complete
theory or reimagining of the law of occupation. Instead, this article offers an alternative point of departure and seeks to shift
the discourse that accompanies prolonged occupation from management to termination.
I. THE OCCUPATION FRAMEWORK AND THE CHALLENGES OF
PROLONGED OCCUPATION
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations denotes when territory becomes occupied.19 It supports the widely-assumed position that
since the 1967 War, the West Bank and other territory captured
by Israel, was or remains under occupation. The article states
that “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
19. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 42.
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under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends
only to the territory where such authority has been established
and can be exercised.”20 Accordingly, as prominently interpreted, international law conceives of occupation as a neutral
phenomenon. With scant consideration for the jus ad bellum, the
legal framework accepts the existence of an occupation.21 The occupying power may be waging a war of aggression or it may be
the victim of aggression. Although the jus ad bellum distinguishes between these origins and attaches the label of illegality
to the former, the legal framework is commonly interpreted to
accept the existence of occupation. Regardless of cause or duration, occupation is viewed as a neutral, non-normative, fact.22
War’s inevitability prompts occupation’s regulation. The occupation framework is founded upon the principle of the inalienability of sovereignty.23 Its early development and codification
was influenced by a nineteenth century European desire to preserve sovereign prerogative.24 International law became a placeholder. Upon the factual existence of an occupation, the occupation framework preserves the status quo ante bellum.25 Regardless of cause, it operates to manage the spatial problem that results from the suspension of sovereignty and the imposition of
foreign control.26 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations compels
the occupying power to, “restore and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country.”27

20. Id. art. 42.
21. See Rotem Giladi, The Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction and the
Law of Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 246, 269 72 (2008). See also In re List and
Others (Hostages Trial), 15 Ann. Dig. 632, 637 (U.S. Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1948) [hereinafter Hostages Trial]; Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 306,
¶ 58 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
22. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
2 3 (2009) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION]. See also
BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 15 16; YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF
OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 5 (2009) [hereinafter ARAI-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION].
23. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6.
24. Bhuta, supra note 9, at 729 30.
25. Fox, supra note 10, at 230. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 1 2.
26. Id. at 1.
27. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 43.

120

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:1

The Hague Regulations, however, conveyed minimal regard
for the interests of the occupied population. They sought to preserve state prerogatives, protect property rights, and deny sovereignty by conquest.28 Despite its selective Eurocentric origins,
the occupation framework’s subsequent development corresponded with international law’s growing humanitarian overtures.29 Alongside the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva
Convention would form the core of IHL. Historically, upon the
imposition of foreign control, territory was either subsumed or
neglected.30 Resigned to war, the occupation framework
acknowledges that foreign control often accompanies or succeeds
hostilities.31 The occupation framework intends to protect sovereign interests from annexation and safeguard the local population from disregard.32 The Fourth Geneva Convention expanded
upon the Hague formulation.33 Article 64 prescribes, that while
subject to notable exceptions, “[t]he penal laws of the occupied
territory shall remain in force. . . .”34 This is understood to expand upon Article 43’s preservationist character. It shifts emphasis from political to humanitarian interests and provides the
occupying power with a further, yet still limited, duty to proactively regulate the territory.35
The occupation framework was now informed by humanitarian intentions. Yet, as codified by Articles 43 and 64, the legal
framework’s primary purpose continued to ensure that an occupying power may not acquire sovereignty. With limited exceptions, the legal and political foundations of the occupied territory
28. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 29. See also Jean L. Cohen, The Role of
International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward a Jus Post
Bellum for Interim Occupations , 51 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 498, 506 507 (2006
2007).
29. Fox, supra note 10, at 229. See generally Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (2000); Cohen, supra note
28, at 502 13.
30. See generally SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT TO CONQUEST: THE
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(1988).
31. Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
249, 251 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts, Military Occupation].
32. Fox, supra note 10, at 229 30.
33. Id. at 235.
34. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time Of War art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention].
35. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 72 74.
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would be preserved.36 Collectively, these provisions establish the
conservationist principle.37 The legal framework, however,
maintained a nineteenth century conception of occupation.
Within, “occupations were of relatively short duration, during
which occupants, by and large, retained existing legislation as
much as possible.”38
Although occupation is clearly understood to be a temporary
regime, international law is largely silent on questions of duration. The prominent interpretative approach seizes upon this. A
meeting of legal experts, convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), agreed that IHL did not impose formal limits on the length of an occupation. Based upon a nonnormative reading focused exclusively on duration and neglecting the altered form of control that accompanies prolonged
occupation the expert panel accentuated the framework’s failure to denote a temporal limitation. The group stated that,
“nothing under IHL would prevent occupying powers from embarking on a long-term occupation and that occupation law
would continue to provide the legal framework applicable in
such circumstances.”39
The framework’s efforts to regulate the tripartite relationship
between local inhabitants, the displaced sovereign government,
and the occupying power developed alongside the presumption
that the triggering conflict would be of limited duration.40
Promptly, upon the establishment of peace, normality would revert.41 In accordance, an occupation was understood to end in
one of two ways: (1) either the fortunes of war are altered and
the occupying power loses military control of the territory it formally held, or (2) the occupation is brought to an end through a

36. Fox, supra note 10, at 236.
37. Id. at 235 36.
38. BENVENISTI, supra 8, at 70.
39. Rep. of the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Expert Meeting: Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territories, at 74 (2012).
[hereinafter ICRC Expert Meeting].
40. Michael Bothe, The Administration of Occupied Territory, in THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1455, 1456 (Andrew Clapham, Paola
Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).
41. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 28. See Raymond T. Yingling & Robert W.
Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 393 (1952) (For a
general history of the drafting and development of the Fourth Geneva Convention.).
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negotiated agreement.42 Often, however, both historical and contemporary occupations failed to match the paradigmatic vision
that informed the legal framework.43
As a result, protection gaps and structural discrepancies
emerged. In as early as 1949, the inconsistencies between observed manifestations of occupation and the newly formulated
occupation framework’s ability to effectively govern prolonged
occupation were considered. The crux of the critique provided by
Doris Appel Graber was direct. Graber plainly asserted that the
existing legal treatment appeared fragmented. The legal framework had developed within and was influenced by a non-analogous historical period of relative peace. This was not suited to
govern the complexity of contemporary occupations.44
The conservationist principle prohibits an occupying power
from imposing enduring or fundamental changes. Yet as any society evolves, effective regulation requires political, economic,
social, and legal development. Often, these needs appeared in
tension with the occupation framework’s preservationist character. Adam Roberts’s defining work on prolonged occupation advances this notion. Roberts demonstrated that an inherent inconsistency existed between the legal framework’s treatment of
occupation as constituting a provisional state and contemporary
manifestations of occupation.45 In response to this apparent incompatibility, Roberts asked, “To what extent are international
legal rules formally applicable, and practically relevant, to a prolonged military occupation?”46 Writing over a quarter-century
42. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11. See also DINSTEIN,
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 271 72.
43. See Roberts, Military Occupation, supra note 31, at 261 94 (Adam Roberts provided a list of seventeen forms of military occupation, the vast majority
of which do not directly conform to the traditional legal framework’s conception
of occupation).
44. See D.A. GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 1863 1914: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 37 (1949). See also Iain Scobbie,
International Law and the Prolonged Occupation of Palestine, U.N.
ROUNDTABLE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 3 (2015),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277290147_International_law_and_the_prolonged_occupation_of_Palestine.
45. See Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 47 (Roberts cites
the Allied occupations of Japan and Germany, the South African occupation of
Namibia, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, the Moroccan presence
in Western Sahara, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea as modern
examples).
46. Id. at 44.
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ago, Roberts argued that this question had assumed prominence
due to the exceptional duration of Israel’s presence within the
territory that came under its control in 1967.47
The point at which an occupation becomes prolonged will, as
Adam Roberts observed, remain a contentious issue.48 Commentators have proposed durational limits. An occupation is declared prolonged when it exceeds a predetermined timescale.49
This determination, however, is not suited to a fixed chronological limit. It must be cognizant of the form of control that an occupation has assumed. An occupation becomes prolonged when
it no longer adheres to the principle of temporality. Temporality
is understood holistically. It is informed by an occupation’s duration but also its condition.
This article suggests that an occupation becomes prolonged
when it constitutes a form of control that threatens to become
permanent. A prolonged occupation is a quasi-permanent administrative relationship that constitutes something other than
a temporarily imposed humanitarian arrangement. This is more
of a competence and observational-based trigger than one focused on the precise temporal scope of an occupation. This proposed understanding recognizes that the hallmark of a prolonged occupation is apparent when the factual accounting of the
occupation threatens the regulatory ability of international law.
This risks an occupation becoming indefinite and eventually irreversible.
Many of the challenges presented by prolonged occupation are
widely understood. Roberts explained that the law of occupation
is often interpreted to provide the occupying power with a large
measure of authority. Although this may be justifiable in times
of direct hostilities, Roberts believed this arrangement was not
sustainable. It accentuated the likelihood, as the occupation’s
duration increased, that the legal framework’s conservationist
47. Id. See also ZERTAL & ELDAR, supra note 4; GORENBERG, ACCIDENTIAL
EMPIRE, supra note 17 (For general historical accounts of Israel’s presence
within the Palestinian territories.).
48. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 47.
49. Id. at 47 (Adam Robert, for example, defined prolonged occupation as
lasting for more than five years and as extending into a period when hostilities
are sharply reduced). See also Richard Falk, Some Legal Reflections on Prolonged Israeli Occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, 2 J. REFUGEE STUD. 40,
45 47 (1989) (Alternatively, Richard Falk has suggested imposing specific obligations on an occupying power whose occupation has researched ten years in
duration.).
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orientation would hinder the socio-economic development of the
occupied territory.50 Roberts argued that if the existing framework was not adapted to recognize the characteristics and challenges posed by prolonged occupation, the framework itself could
leave a society politically and economically underdeveloped.51
According to Roberts, responses to these challenges cannot be
indefinitely neglected due to the conservationist nature of the
occupation framework. Roberts, however, notes that providing
an occupying power with additional latitude carries risk. The
danger, said Roberts, “in making such a suggestion is that it may
seem to imply the further suggestion that those parts of the law
of war that deal with military occupations may not be fully applicable, and that departures from the law may be permissible.”52
Resulting engagements with prolonged occupation are commonly structured by the prominent, interpretive approach.
These legal engagements attempt to better utilize the legal
framework. Efforts by states, courts, and scholars to address the
challenges created by prolonged occupation are grounded within
a factual notion of occupation. They avoid normative assessments. Instead, they accept that regardless of the occupation’s
duration, a traditionally-interpreted occupation framework continues to govern prolonged occupation. To address the myriad
challenges posed by this form of occupation, competing interests
must be effectively managed.
The critiques and premise offered by Roberts continue to provide a point of departure for subsequent responses. Although
Roberts acknowledged the challenges posed by prolonged occupation identifying the tension of addressing these challenges
through a legal regime built upon the conservationist principle
subsequent responses have maintained fidelity to the prominent
interpretation of the occupation framework. The ensuing debate
fixates on the extent to which, and the means by which, an occupying power should or should not be accorded additional latitude
to manage the intrinsic challenges presented by prolonged occupation.53
50. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 96.
51. Id. at 52.
52. Id. at 51.
53. Vaios Koutroulis, The Application of International Humanitarian Law
and International Human Rights Law in Situation of Prolonged Occupation:
Only a Matter of Time?, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165, 176 (2012).
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Christine Chinkin explains that the “inherent dilemma”
within this debate is that the prolonged nature of the occupation
may be invoked both in favor of and in opposition to increasing
the allowances that an occupying power receives.54 Certainly,
there are instances where broadening the occupying power’s discretion will appear prudent. If the necessity of prolonged occupation inevitably breeds inherent challenges, if over time the
failure to respond to demographic shifts and economic stagnation threatens the interests of the occupied population, the provision of expansive latitude will exhibit moral pull. Equally,
however, one can envision numerous scenarios in which such latitude would convey a disproportionate focus on the rights of the
occupying power.
Chinkin neatly captures the confines of the discourse that surrounds prolonged occupation. The identified dilemma, however,
is premised on the prominent interpretative approach. This common legal framing responds exclusively to managerial challenges that result from the occupation’s duration. Fixation on
these governance challenges purport to ensure the occupied population’s long-term needs. These will demand attention. Yet, an
exclusive managerial approach neglects the causes and consequences of the altered form of control embodied by prolonged occupation. Upon this interpretative approach, the challenges presented by prolonged occupation may only be managed. Management is facilitated and improved by either increasing or limiting
the occupying power’s control of the seized territory. Upon this
prominent interpretative approach, the elicited replies regularly
elect management as the necessary, or only, response.
This singular view of prolonged occupation allows duration to
become either a guise or a justification for quasi-permanent control. Israel’s occupation of the West Bank provides numerous examples of an occupying power both appealing to and employing
this approach to justify a novel form of regulation. Adhering to
a non-normative reading of the occupation framework that links
prolonged occupation to duration not conditions confines the
forms of legal engagement that an actor may take when responding to the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. It allows an
occupying power to justify initiatives that purport to remedy
54. See Christine Chinkin, Laws of Occupation, in MULTILATERALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH WESTERN SAHARA AS A CASE STUDY 167, 178 (Neville
Botha, Michèle Olivier & Delarey van Tonder eds. 2010).
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these challenges. Such an approach the reliance upon continual management to alleviate the effects of prolonged occupation risks further entrenching or perpetuating occupation
within the West Bank and beyond.
II. THE PROMINENT INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH: THE
FACILITATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERPETUAL
MANAGEMENT OF PROLONGED OCCUPATION
Immediately following the 1967 War, legal considerations
were overshadowed by the dawn of a new regional reality. Soon,
however, international law became a prominent feature of Israel’s newfound control of the territory it assumed upon victory.55 This began gradually and proceeded haphazardly. Days
after the cessation of hostilities, Israel pledged to apply the occupation framework. It emphasized its commitment to the wellbeing of the local Palestinian populace.56 Israel, however, shifted
from its initial pronouncement and began questioning the West
Bank’s legal status. Weeks after the war had ended, YaakovShimshon Shapira, then Minister of Justice, addressed the
Knesset. Shapira argued that Israel should not assume the status of an occupying power within the recently “liberated territory.”57 Israel then passed an ordinance permitting its government to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration “to
any area of Eretz Israel (Palestine)” that it deemed necessary.58
The ordinance was swiftly invoked.59 It extended Israeli jurisdiction into East Jerusalem but was not applied within the West
55. See AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 250 264
(2001) (For an account of the events that immediately followed the 1967 War).
56. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report Under General Assembly Resolution 2254 (ES-V) Relating to Jerusalem, U.N. Doc. S/8146, annex II (Sept.
12, 1967) (For an account of the various claims and efforts made by Israeli
officials). See Transcript No. 126 of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, 5727 1967, Sixth Knesset, Second Session (Akevot trans., 1967) (Isr.),
available at http://akevot.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/MAG-BriefingEng.pdf. (For an account of recently released archival material that demonstrates Israel’s intention to adhere to the occupation framework in the weeks
following the war.).
57. ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 111
(1978).
58. Id. See also Law and Administrative Ordinance (Amendment No. 11),
5727 1967, 21 LSI 75 (1966 67) (Isr.).
59. Ian S. Lustick, Has Israel Annexed East Jerusalem?, 5 MIDDLE EAST POL.
35, 36-37 (1997).
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Bank.60 Official references to the Fourth Geneva Convention
were removed.61 The following year, Israel formally abandoned
the term West Bank, reverting to the region’s historical Hebrew
names, Judea and Samaria. Despite these changes, Israel refrained from formally extending jurisdiction to or claiming sovereignty of the West Bank. It did, however, continue to question
the territory’s legal status.62 As Israel moved away from its initial commitment to the occupation framework, the notion of settling the West Bank entered the public discourse.63
Despite Israel’s evolving position, the international community remained steadfast. The Security Council called upon the
involved governments to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions.64 Israel was condemned during successive emergency sessions of the General Assembly. These denunciations ranged in
tenor and called upon Israel to remove its military from the territories it now held.65 In response to the growing international
consensus, Israel refuted the premise that its presence within
the West Bank constituted an occupation. Israeli officials
adopted an amended version of the “missing reversioner thesis”
developed by Yehuda Blum.66 This drew upon the notion of terra
nullius. Though it avoided such framing by name, Blum’s thesis
60. GERSON, supra note 57, at 111.
61. Id.
62. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director Memo 765, Israel State Archives File A-7371/4 (Akevot trans., Mar. 20, 1968) (Isr.), available at http://akevot.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Comay-Meron Cable-Eng.pdf. (Recently released diplomatic cables, from within Israel’s Foreign Ministry, dispute the sincerity of these queries. The exchanges indicate that officials within
the Ministry understood that the occupation framework was legally applicable
and that certain actions taken and intended within the territories would
violate the framework.).
63. ZERTAL & ELDAR, supra note 4, at 333 34. See also SHAFIR, supra note 2,
at 96.
64. S.C. Res. 237, ¶ 2 (June 14, 1967).
65. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 1526th plen. mtg. at ¶ 82, U.N. Doc.
A/PV.1526 (June 19, 1967) (The strongest accusations levied against Israel
came from the Arab and Soviet delegations). See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
1554th plen. mtg. at ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1554 (July 14, 1967) (For a more
tempered approach.).
66. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT
OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 33 34 (2002) [hereinafter KRETZMER,
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE] (A variety of state representatives presented direct
and amended versions of the missing reversioner thesis before various UN bodies as debates within the legal sphere increasingly raised questions concerning
the status of Israel’s assumed governance of the West Bank.).
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emphasized the perceived sovereign void that existed within the
West Bank.67 An altered, and partially moderated, version of the
approach initially articulated by Blum gained further credence
when presented as official policy by Meir Shamgar, then the Attorney General and later the President of the Israeli Supreme
Court. Writing within his official capacity in the inaugural volume of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights following a symposium at Tel Aviv University, Shamgar concluded that:
the Israeli Government tried therefore to distinguish between
theoretical juridical and political problems on the one hand,
and the observance of the humanitarian provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention on the other hand. Accordingly, the
Government of Israel distinguished between the legal problem
of the applicability to the territories, and decided to act de facto,
in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention.68

Israel’s occupation of the West Bank moved swiftly from
acknowledgement to indeterminacy. Shlomo Gazit, who upon
conclusion of the war was appointed as Coordinator of Activities
in the Territories, was tasked with overseeing Israel’s administration of the West Bank.69 Gazit explained that the occupation’s architects ensured that “the establishment of military government in occupied territory be seen as a temporary phenomenon.”70 Privately, however, Israeli officials acknowledged that
67. See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status
of Judea and Samara, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279, 283 84 (1968) (Yehuda Blum, a legal
scholar and expert in international law at the Hebrew University who would
later become Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations, published an influential article that provided the foundation for Israel’s legal approach to the question of the West Bank’s status. Blum’s thesis, known as the missing reversioner
theory, was premised on the assertion that Jordan’s presence throughout the
West Bank prior to 1967 was the result of illegal aggression. Following the
termination of the British Mandate in 1948, the relevant territory lacked a
legitimate sovereign. While the question of Jordanian sovereignty over the
West Bank had been emphatically denounced by the international community,
Blum contended, “the legal standing of Israel in the territories in question is
thus that of a state which is lawfully in control of territory in respect of which
no other state can show a better title.”).
68. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 266 (1971) [hereinafter Shamgar,
Observance of International Law].
69. SHLOMO GAZIT, THE CARROT AND THE STICK: ISRAEL’S POLICY IN JUDEA
AND SAMARIA, 1967 68 7 (1995).
70. Id.
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their presence within the territories would likely endure. Moshe
Dayan, Israel’s Defense Minister, instructed Gazit to prepare for
an “extended stay.”71
A factual conception of occupation facilitated Israel’s prolonged presence. Meir Shamgar, then a Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, offered a traditional reading of the occupation
framework. This forwarded a singular notion of temporality. It
accentuated the absence of a durational limitation and remained
silent on the form of control that an unconstrained occupation
would assume. Shamgar wrote that “according to International
Law the exercise of the right of military administration over the
territory and its inhabitants had no time-limit, because it reflected a factual situation and pending an alternative political or
military solution this system of government could, from the legal
point of view, continue indefinitely.”72 This common interpretative approach became the foundation of Israel’s subsequent legal
engagements with the occupation framework.73
Writing in 1990, Adam Roberts correctly predicted Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territories.74 The entrenchment of Israel’s presence throughout the West Bank accentuated
questions concerning the occupation framework’s appropriateness. As Israel continued to govern the West Bank and establish
its presence through the construction of settlements and their
associated infrastructure, it would increasingly appeal to the occupation framework and management approach. As with the
scholarly and juridical deliberations that acknowledged the occupation framework’s inadequacies, Israel purported that many
of its legal engagements were in response to the challenges presented by this particular form of occupation. Imposed policies
were justified in response to the occupation’s duration.
Grounded within a non-normative conception of occupation,
these responses managed the results, and neglected the causes,
of prolonged occupation. Collectively, they contributed to the
quasi-permanent form of control that the occupation would assume.
71. Id. at x.
72. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government
The Initial Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967 1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 14, 43 (Meir Shamgar
ed., 1982) [hereinafter Shamgar, Legal Concepts].
73. GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL, supra note 7, at 3.
74. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 103.
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A. The Challenge of Economic Development
On May 30, 1967, King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Abdel Nasser signed a joint defense agreement.75 Regional
tensions escalated. Nasser declared that “our basic objective will
be the destruction of Israel.”76 A little more than a week later,
Israel would gain control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Combat forces gave way to military government units who expeditiously established an administrative structure.77 Duties were
divided between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel’s
Government. Security and near-term economic needs came under the purview of military command. Political considerations
and long-term economic matters would be addressed by ministerial committees.78 The Military Government declared that its
primary objective was to oversee the resumption of normality.
Corresponding efforts were largely guided by economic objectives.79
Under the direction of Moshe Dayan, Israel implemented policies intended to foster economic integration with the assumed
territories. The resulting governance structure claimed to provide for the “legitimate needs of local inhabitants and the security requirements of Israel itself.”80 Ostensibly, this was consistent with the obligations imposed by the occupation framework. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires an occupying
power to restore and ensure public order and civil life throughout the occupied territory.81 The precise meaning of the provision
and the extent of the obligations that it imposes are, however,

75. Laura M. James, Egypt: Dangerous Illusions, in THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI
WAR: ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 56 70 (William Roger Lewis & Avi Shlaim
eds., 2012).
76. MARTHA GELLHORN, THE FACE OF WAR 283 (1988).
77. Nimrod Raphaeli, Military Government in the Occupied Territories: An
Israeli View, 23 MIDDLE E. J. 177, 178 79 (1969).
78. GERSON, supra note 57, at 110 111.
79. Raphaeli, supra note 77, at 179.
80. Id. at 180.
81. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 43 (The Article states,
“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”).
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unclear.82 Yet despite interpretative discord, it is widely assumed that Article 43 compels the occupying power to, inter alia,
“restore order and normal economic life in the occupied territory.”83
Israel’s earliest interventions appear consistent with the provision. The Military Government worked to liberalize trade,
manage produce surpluses, protect the agricultural sector, and
provide development loans.84 The passage of time would, however, witness the evolving needs of the occupied population. It
would bring shifting priorities amongst the occupying power.
The conventional application of the occupation framework appeared insufficient to pacify the involved interests. The uncertainty conveyed by the occupation framework, observations of its
selective application, and its conservationist orientation
prompted Adam Roberts to ask whether the framework unnecessarily confined economic development.85 During prolonged occupation, the desire for economic stewardship in response to
market changes, anticipated societal needs, technological advancements, and demographic shifts creates tension with the
occupation framework’s conservationist stance.86 To resolve this
discordancy, to begin responding to the challenge of economic
development within prolonged occupation, Israel referenced the
occupation’s duration to justify “more effective” means of management.87

82. See Marco Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and
Civil Life by Occupying Powers, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 661, 663 (2005) [hereinafter
Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance].
83. Id. at 663. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003) (Following the US-led
invasion of Iraq, the Security Council required the occupying power to, “promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the
territory.”). See also Bothe, supra note 40, at 1467.
84. Raphaeli, supra note 77, at 179 80. See also NEVE GORDON, ISRAEL’S
OCCUPATION 64-65 (2008).
85. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 52.
86. See Trial of Alfreid Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen Und Halbach and
Eleven Others (The Krupp Trial) (U.S. Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1948), in
U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, 10 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 135
(1949) (The Military Tribunal at Nuremberg expressing the conservationist
principle. In the Krupp Trial, the Tribunal held, inter alia, that “the economic
substance of the belligerently occupied territory must not be taken over by the
occupant or put to the service of his war effort”).
87. See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66.
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Since 1967, the West Bank has been governed as an economic
union with Israel.88 The guiding policy of economic integration
was presented as a benevolent necessity. Israel proclaimed that
“[t]he Six Day War abolished to all intent and purposes the
Green Line’ that in the past demarcated the Israeli sector from
the administered territories. Naturally and unavoidably, these
areas are becoming dependent upon Israel for all their economic
and service needs.”89 A fundamental economic transformation
followed. Various sectors, including agriculture, trade, taxation,
and natural resources, came under Israeli control. Initially, the
imposed single market generated economic gains within the occupied territories.90 Though the successful development of the
West Bank was understood as a mutual benefit, integration
aligned with Israel’s (exclusive) economic interests.91
Many of Israel’s economic interventions were challenged.
Their legality was repeatedly questioned.92 In reply, Israel referenced the need to respond to the particular quandaries evoked
by the occupation’s duration. Corresponding appeals to the management approach were grounded in a non-normative reading of
the occupation framework. In 1972, a labor dispute occurred between hospital employees and a charitable association in Bethlehem. In response, the Military Government initiated settlement proceedings, amended preexisting legislation, and imposed
mandatory arbitration. The petitioner claimed these actions
were beyond the competence of an occupying power. It claimed

88. See Raja Khalidi & Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, The Economic Dimensions of
Prolonged Occupation: Continuity and Change in Israeli Policy Towards the
Palestinian Economy, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/2009/2 (Aug. 2009).
89. See Ministry of Defence, Coordinator of Government Operations in the
Administered Territories, The Administered Territories 1967/1971
Data on
Civilian Activities in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai
(Isr.), cited in BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 224.
90. Id. at 241 42. See also Hisham Awartani, Israel’s Economic Policies in
the Occupied Territories: A Case for International Supervision, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO
DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 399, 401
02 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
91. Id. See also GORDON, supra note 84, at 70.
92. See generally Osama A. Hamed & Radwan A. Shaban, One-Sided Customs and Monetary Union: The Case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under
Israeli Occupation, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE 117 (Stanley
Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma eds., 1993).
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that the imposed measures contravened the occupation framework’s conservationist ethos.93
In the Christian Society case, Israel’s High Court of Justice
considered the aforementioned claims. In response, it offered a
broad interpretation of Article 43.94 Following five years of occupation, the Court drew upon Israel’s elongated presence within
the territories. It identified and responded to the resulting challenges. The occupying power was deemed responsible for ensuring the, “whole social, commercial and economic life of the community.”95 The Court concluded that Israel must acknowledge
changing conditions. It must attend to the resulting challenges.
The Court obliged Israel to adopt measures needed to ensure
“civil life.”96 This broad reading of Article 43 was justified by reference to the prolonged nature of the occupation. As an occupation’s duration increases, the Court held, “[l]ife does not stand
still, and no administration, whether an occupation administration or another, can fulfil its duties with respect to the population if it refrains from legislating and from adapting the legal
situation to the exigencies of modern times.”97
Soon after, a Palestinian utilities provider challenged a Military Government decision appointing an Israeli company to provide electricity to the Hebron area.98 Prior to the order, a municipal generator supplied the city. Demand, however, increased
following the development of Kiryat Arba, the early Israeli settlement located in the hills outside of Hebron. The former Palestinian provider argued that the military order was incompatible
with a conservationist reading of Article 43.99 The petition was
93. KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 58 59.
94. See HCJ 337/71 Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense 26(1) PD 574 (1971) (Isr.) (An English summary of the decision is available at, Court Decisions, Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of
Defense, 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354 (1972)) [hereinafter Christian Society].
95. Id.
96. Id. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 58.
97. Christian Society, supra note 94, at 582. See also, BENVENISTI, supra
note 8, at 246.
98. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 221 22. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION
OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 64 65.
99. See HCJ 256/72 Electric Company for the District of Jerusalem v. Minister of Defence 27(1) PD 124 (1972) (Isr.) [hereinafter Electric Company]. See
also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65 (The Palestinian
Electric Company for the Jerusalem District had been authorized by the Jordanian authorities to supply utilities throughout much of the West Bank prior
to 1967).
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dismissed. The High Court of Justice reaffirmed its expansive
understanding of the occupation framework. It held that the military order was intended to ensure basic needs. The Court invoked the local population’s economic welfare and ruled that the
military commander did not violate the conservationist approach by ensuring the provision of electricity.100
Israel continued to cultivate an expansive interpretation of Article 43. This was based on a dual affirmation. The occupation
framework would remain applicable regardless of the occupation’s duration, but due to the occupation’s duration, particular
management was required. The Court affirmed that economic
initiatives that altered the status quo ante were permissible
when benevolent.101 These early decisions legitimized foundational aspects of the occupation that purported to better manage
the economic and social needs of the local population.102
The economic union that guided many of Israel’s early policies
vis-à-vis the West Bank was justified in accordance with Article
43.103 Such economic management was deemed necessary to “ensure a return to orderly life and prevent the effective observance
of the duty regarding the assurance of la vie publique.”104 These
decisions entrenched an expansive understanding of Article
43.105 They provided the occupying power with broad discretion
100. Id. See also Electric Company, supra note 99.
101. See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 57
74.
102. See HCJ 351/80 Electricity Company for the District of Jerusalem v.
Minister of Energy 35(2) PD 673 (1980) (Isr.) (For the High Court of Justice’s
expansive view on what constituted the local population’s welfare.). See also
KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65 68.
103. See generally HCJ 69/81 Abu Aita et al. v. Commander of Judea and
Samaria et al. 37(2) PD 197, 105 (1983) (Isr.), translated in HCJ 69/81 Abu
Aita et al. v. Regional Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area et al. Judgement, HAMOKED, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=290 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Abu Aita] (In Abu Aita, the High Court of Justice upheld the imposition of a value-added tax (VAT) within the West Bank.
Israel asserted that the imposed VAT was necessary to, “protect the local residents from a situation in which VAT was imposed only in Israel.” In such a
case, they reasoned, “Israel would have had to resurrect the economic borders
and impose restrictions on the free flow of goods and services.” This, Israel
argued, would be detrimental to the local population and inconsistent with the
requirements of Article 43.). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 241.
104. See Abu Aita, supra note 103, at 104 (In which the Court referenced the
original French text of Article 43.). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 224.
105. See HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and
Samaria, ILDC 1820 (Isr.), translated in HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din v. Commander
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to impose economic policies. Ostensibly, these policies were intended to better manage prolonged occupation. They were premised upon an interpretation of the occupation framework that
accepts occupation as fact and the framework’s uninterrupted
relevancy.
In Yesh Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria et al., the High Court directly referenced the prolonged
nature of the occupation. The case addressed Israel’s operation
of several quarries within the West Bank.106 The Court considered and applied Article 55 of the Hague Regulations and, correspondingly, the rules of usufruct.107 It promoted a “broad and
dynamic” reading of the obligations bestowed upon an occupying
power within a prolonged occupation.108 Article 55 implies that
an occupying power may derive benefit from the territory’s natural resources. It is widely understood, however, that an occupying power is prohibited from imposing changes to production levels and that any changes must not be to the detriment of the
local population.109
Although the Court held that Israel’s operation of the quarries
was consistent with the rules of usufruct, it nevertheless pivoted

of the IDF Forces in the West Bank et al., Judgement, HAMOKED,
http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Documents2185 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Yesh Din]. See also David Kretzmer, The Law of
Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
207, 218 (2012) [hereinafter Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation].
106. See generally Valentina Azarova, Exploiting a Dynamic Interpretation:
The High Court of Justice and Israel’s Quarries in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, EJIL TALK! (Feb. 12 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/exploiting-a-dynamic-interpretation-the-israeli-high-court-of-justice-accepts-the-legality-ofisraels-quarrying-activities-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory [hereinafter
Azarova, Dynamic Interpretation] (On Israel’s operation of quarries throughout the West Bank from the 1970s onward.).
107. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 55 (Article 55 states that,
“the occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary
of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the
capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules
of usufruct.”). See also Aeyal Gross, Israel is Exploiting the Resources of the
Occupied West Bank, HAARTEZ (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/israelis-exploiting-the-resources-of-the-occupied-west-bank-1.403988 [hereinafter
Gross, Israel Exploiting Resources].
108. Gross, Israel Exploiting Resources, supra note 107.
109. Azarova, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 106. See also ARAITAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 196 97.
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to Article 43.110 It noted that Israel’s operation of the quarries
served the welfare of the local population.111 The Court’s decision
was premised on the prominent interpretation of the framework.
It endorsed the framework while coupling its application with
the view that management initiatives were required to benefit
the local population. The High Court acknowledged that this
management approach became necessary due to the occupation’s
duration:
the traditional occupation laws require adjustment to the prolonged duration of the occupation, to the continuity of normal
life in the Area and to the sustainability of economic relations
between the two authorities the occupier and the occupied. . .
. This kind of conception supports the adoption of a wide and
dynamic view of the duties of the military commander in the
Area, which impose upon him, inter alia, the responsibility to
ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous
and various fields, including the fields of economic infrastructure and its development.112

This hints at the notion of a benevolent occupier. The risks of
Israel’s economic management would, however, become apparent. Following an initial period of growth, the Palestinian economy began a sustained decline.113 Israel derived benefit from its
economic control of the West Bank. It gained access to a large,
affordable, labor pool.114 This increased economic prosperity
within Israel.115 At the same time, however, Shlomo Gazit explains that “the Israeli authorities and the military government
did little to develop the local economic infrastructure.”116

110. Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 221 22.
111. Id. at 222 (Kretzmer describing that the High Court of Justice noted
that the quarries produced stone that could be used by local Palestinians, paid
royalties to the civil administration that could be reinvested in local projects,
employed a segment of the local population, and contributed to the area’s modernization.).
112. Yesh Din, supra note 105, ¶ 10. See also Azarova, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 106.
113. Arie Arnon, Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories:
The Economic Dimension, 1967 2007, 61 MIDDLE E. J. 573, 576 79 (2007).
114. Zeev Rosenhek, The Political Dynamics of a Segmented Labour Market:
Palestinian Citizens, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Migrant
Workers in Israel, 46 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 231, 238 41 (2003).
115. Id.
116. Arnon, supra note 113, at 581 82. See also GAZIT, supra note 69, at 235.
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Israel’s economic approach to the West Bank continued to
shift.117 The policy of pacification through increased prosperity
was replaced by initiatives that fortified Israel’s control of the
territory.118 Customs arrangements heavily favored Israeli
goods, which benefited from unfettered access to the West Bank
and Gaza. Palestinian imports were restricted.119 Imposed policies increasingly prioritized Israel’s economic objectives. By the
mid-2000s, the Palestinian economy teetered. Its GDP had
plummeted. Following the Second Intifada, unemployment
soared. The World Bank estimated that nearly 70 percent of the
Palestinian population now lived in poverty.120
Israel’s economic management was condemned.121 In the late
1980s, the General Assembly urged the international community to provide economic assistance to the Palestinians.122 Despite acknowledging that economic aid was not a substitute for
a “genuine and just solution to the question of Palestine,” the
General Assembly recognized the continued relevance of the occupation framework.123 It too opted in favor of better management. The international community pressed Israel to better ensure Palestine’s economic needs.124 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development favored working within the international community to “encourage Israel to allow wide-ranging economic policy reform and liberalization in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including the right to economic policy formulation and management by the Palestinian people.”125

117. See generally SHIR HEVER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISRAEL’S
OCCUPATION: REPRESSION BEYOND EXPLOITATION (2010).
118. See GORDON, supra note 84, at 9, 14 22, 62 66.
119. Leila Farsakh, The Political Economy of Israeli Occupation: What is Colonial About It?, 8 MIT ELECTRONIC J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 41, 47 (2008).
120. Id. at 41. See also World Bank, Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development: Report for the Pledging Conference (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/2942641166525851073/ParisconferencepaperDec17.pdf.
121. See G.A. Res. 43/178, ¶ 13 (Dec. 20, 1988) (Condemning Israel for its
“brutal economic and social policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory.”).
122. Id. See also, G.A. Res. 42/166, ¶ 5 (Dec. 11, 1987).
123. See G.A. Res. 43/178, supra note 121, at ¶ 15.
124. See Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad, supra note 88, at 7.
125. Id. See also U.N. Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), Recent Economic Developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/TD/B/1221 (1989).
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The economic challenges that resulted from the prolonged nature of the occupation have spurred continuous debate. While
evoking diverse perspectives and encouraging an array of policy
proposals, these debates rarely question the occupation framework’s continued relevance. Instead, they assume a non-normative conception of occupation. They seek to provide a more effective means of managing the resulting situation. Despite Israel’s
increasingly entrenched presence throughout the West Bank,
notwithstanding the precariousness of the Palestinians’ economic conditions, variants of the management approach remain
the favored means of addressing the exigencies of prolonged occupation. Within scholarly debates, proposals often contest what
Christine Chinkin identified as the “inherent dilemma” of determining the extent to which an occupying power should receive
additional latitude. The prominent debates recognize that the
occupation framework’s conservationist design impedes economic adaptability. All agree that this requires specific management.126 Despite the benevolent intentions that accompany these
deliberations, they largely neglect the possibility that perpetual
management often contributes to perpetual occupation.
B. The Challenge of Legislative Competence and Long-term
Planning
The consequences of Israel’s territorial acquisition consumed
its political and legal establishments in debate. Government officials contemplated their newly imposed duties and rights. Meir
Shamgar, then the IDF’s Military Advocate General, told a
Knesset Committee:
Our aim is to minimize legislation on pure security and administrative matters, based on Article 64 of the Geneva Conventions, help restore life to its previous course through our actions and enable a smooth operation of civil courts as soon as
126. See, e.g., ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 89 (1971). See also Roberts, Prolonged Occupation,
supra note 11, at 53 (acknowledging a need to recognize the occupier’s ability
to affect prolonged occupation. This would facilitate (necessary) efforts to make
“drastic and permanent changes in the economy or the system of government”).
See Marco Sassòli, Article 43 of The Hague Regulations and Peace Operations
in the Twenty-First Century, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. RES. INITIATIVE 15 (2004)
[hereinafter Sassòli, Article 43] (claiming that “sooner or later, a prolonged
military occupation faces the need to adopt legislative measures in order to let
the occupied country evolve”).
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possible. All of this while maintaining the principle of ensuring
the interests of military control over the areas. 127

Immediately following the 1967 War, Israel announced its first
military orders. Existing law, in force prior to June 1967, would
be retained unless it contravened a subsequent military directive.128 This pronouncement accorded with Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations. The order empowered the Military Commander to issue legislative decrees deemed necessary to administer the assumed territory. During the following months and
then years, military officials issued a vast network of orders.129
Though these orders formally maintained much of the preexisting legislative structure, they developed the occupation’s legal
foundation.130
The preferred use of administrative actions the lessening of
legislative initiatives embraces a conservationist interpretation of the occupation framework. The occupying power’s legislative competence to introduce, annul, or amend laws within the
controlled territory is delineated in both the Hague Regulations
and the Fourth Geneva Convention.131 Traditionally, the occupying power’s ability to legislate is read restrictively.132 As with
the economic development debate, however, this raises various
questions. These query the efficacy of the occupation framework.
When applied to prolonged occupation, they ask whether the
framework frustrates the implementation of necessary legislative initiatives. They consider whether it impairs the imposition
of policies intended to affect long-term change.133
Eyal Benvenisti explains that historically, “the occupant was
not expected, during the anticipated short period of occupation,
127. See Transcript No. 126 of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee,
supra note 56.
128. See Israel Defence Forces, Proclamation Concerning Law and Administration (Judaea and Samaria), 5727 1967, no. 2 7 (Isr.). See also,
BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 212.
129. RAJA SHEHADEH, THE LAW OF THE LAND: SETTLEMENTS AND LAND ISSUES
UNDER ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION 5 (1993).
130. See Raja Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 151, 152 166 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
131. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, arts. 64 75.
132. Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance, supra note 82, at 668.
133. See, e.g., MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 225
26 (1959). See also Harris, supra note 3, at 103; Sassòli, Legislation and
Maintenance, supra note 82, at 679.
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to have pressing interests in changing the law to regulate the
activities of the population except for what was necessary for the
safety of its forces.”134 By the First World War, however, this restrictive reading of Article 43 was deemed untenable. Occupying
powers became increasingly proactive. They desired flexibility.135 Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provided
broader exceptions to the framework’s legislative limitations. 136
While this increased the occupier’s ability to impose legislation
or policy designed to create long-term change, the occupation
framework maintained its conservationist purpose.137
The nature of occupation evolved throughout the latter-half of
the twentieth century. Initiatives imposed by occupiers were increasingly framed as responses to the exigencies of prolonged (or
transformative) occupations.138 The occupation framework’s traditional laissez-faire approach to governance was presented as
implausible.139 Morris Greenspan argued that human existence
requires organic growth. It is impossible for a state to mark time
indefinitely. Pragmatically, Greenspan noted the need for adaptive management, arguing that, “political decisions must be
taken, policies have to be formulated and carried out.”140
Increasingly, legislative initiatives were understood as a necessary means of responding to social, economic, and political
134. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 91 (This, according to Benvenisti, was
driven by the prevailing laissez-faire approach which influenced minimalist
interpretations of the Regulation’s provisions.).
135. Id.
136. See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Law-Making and the Judicial Guarantees
in Occupied Territories, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY
1421, 1422 23 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Law-Making and Judicial Guarantees]. See also
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 64 (Allowances for the “repeal
or suspension” of existing legislation, deemed either a security threat or an
imposition to the Convention’s application, and the positive formulation of the
Article’s second paragraph (enabling the occupying power to fulfil its obligations under the Convention, maintain orderly government, and ensure security) were now read permissively). See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION,
supra note 22, at 110 (describing Article 64 as an “amplification and clarification” of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations). See also BENVENISTI, supra note
8, at 90, 96.
137. Id. at 120, 126. See also Bothe, supra note 40, at 1483.
138. See Steven R. Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial
Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 695, 706
(2005).
139. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 3, at 103.
140. See GREENSPAN, supra note 133.
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changes.141 These changes are unavoidable, the inevitable byproducts of the passage of time. They produce challenges and
legal systems adapt accordingly. Initiatives and policies are introduced to meet evolving needs. Within a prolonged occupation,
however, these unavoidable developments risk neglect. Proponents favored ensuring that the occupying power was not constrained by a conservationist reading of the framework. The
longer an occupation lasts, Dinstein explains, “the more compelling the need to weigh the merits of a whole gamut of novel legislative measures designed to ensure the societal needs in the
occupied territory do not remain too long in a legal limbo.”142
The Likud Party’s electoral ascendency in 1977 heralded the
expansion of the settlement project.143 Israel began imposing legislation and enacting policy designed to have permanent or longterm influence on the affected territory.144 A large transportation network was developed to modernize roadways within the
West Bank. This would link various settlements to Jerusalem.145
The initiative was challenged in Ja’amait Ascan v Commander
of the IDF in Judea and Samaria.146 The petitioners, whose land
would be expropriated to enable construction, argued that the
planning initiative primarily served Israeli interests and that
the project’s permanence was inconsistent with a temporary notion of occupation.147
Israel refuted these claims. It asserted that the project benefited local residents and cited the existing infrastructure’s inability to serve the growing population.148 Israel referenced Article 43. It argued that due to the occupation’s duration, it could
141. See generally ARAI-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at
91 136.
142. DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 116 17.
143. See generally GORENBERG, ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE, supra note 17.
144. See generally KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 76.
145. Id. at 94 95 (noting that planners and the relevant authorities explicitly
acknowledged the strategic significance of the proposed transportation networks. The creation of highways linking the settlements to Israel was determined to facilitate varied political objectives).
146. See generally HCJ 393/82 Ja’amait Ascan v. Commander of the IDF in
Judea and Samaria, 37(4) PD 785 (1983) (Isr.), translated in HCJ 393/82
Jam’iat Iscan Al-Ma’almoun v. IDF Commander in the Judea and Samaria
Area
Judgment,
HAMOKED,
http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=160 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Ja’amait Ascan].
See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 97 98.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 97.
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not be required to preserve a distant status quo. A military government was obliged to further the local population’s interests.149 Long-term planning initiatives were framed as requirements. To ensure effective management, the occupier was to anticipate local needs and respond accordingly.150
In Ja’amait Ascan, the High Court of Justice endorsed Israel’s
appeal to the management approach. In response to the requirements of prolonged occupation, the Court favored an interventionist response. Citing Morris Greenspan’s call for increased
legislative competence, it held that:
the power of the military government extends to taking all necessary measures to ensure growth, change and development.
The conclusion that follows is that a military government may
develop industry, trade, agriculture, education, health and welfare and other such matters which are related to good governance and are required in order to ensure the changing needs of
the population in an area under belligerent occupation. 151

The Court explored the policy’s motives.152 Ultimately, it accepted the Government’s claim that the proposed changes were
made necessary by the passage of time. It accepted that they
would serve local interests and were thus compliant with Article
43 of the Hague Regulations.153
Israeli initiatives, ostensibly intended to respond to the challenges of prolonged occupation, were deemed legitimate if they
benefited the local population. They were required to refrain
from altering the basic institutions of the occupied territory.154
Article 43 was reinterpreted by the Court to better respond to
prolonged occupation. Despite the conservationist principle’s
historical origins, the Court held that contemporary manifesta-

149. Id.
150. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 246.
151. Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 26.
152. Id. See KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 98 (noting
that the Court understood, in accordance with the Hague Regulations, that the
dominant motive must be to serve the interest of the local population. It asked
whether the planning initiative had been taken to meet Israel’s exclusive interests or if the good of the local population had been a guiding factor in the
decision).
153. Id.
154. Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 220. See
also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 246.
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tions of occupation should now guide the framework’s application. Article 43 must distinguish between short and long-term
occupations. Its application would consider the passage of time.
It would respond to altering conditions when establishing the
requirements of civil life and public order. The High Court held
that the military government, “may require long-term investments that will effect changes that will remain after the occupation ends.”155
This need to impose change and address the inevitable results
of prolonged occupation guided the Court’s subsequent oversight. It justified the Military Government’s desire to move beyond a conservationist conception of the occupation framework.156 Unconfined and with extensive discretion, it directed Israeli efforts purporting to better manage prolonged occupation.
This facilitated the imposition of legislation and policy that
would impose long-term changes. Despite the benevolent façade
of the Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 43, David
Kretzmer notes, “that there is no lack of evidence to show that
[the resulting initiatives were] carried out as part of a general
plan for the West Bank that was based on the planner’s perception of Israeli interests.”157
Settlement growth was accompanied by massive infrastructure investments. The transportation network, established in
accordance with the Ja’amait Ascan decision, expanded. Approximately 1660 kilometers of roadways now link settlements to urban centers in Israel.158 As of 2005, the formal boundaries of Israel’s settlements constituted a mere 3 percent of the West
Bank. The associated infrastructure, however, extended Israel’s
physical presence to over 40 percent of the territory.159
This creates significant impediments for the Palestinian population. Beyond linking the settlements to Israel, the road network that stretches throughout the West Bank impedes Pales155. KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 69. See also
Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶¶ 21 22.
156. Emma Playfair, Playing on Principle? Israel’s Justification for its Administrative Acts in the Occupied West Bank, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 205, 210 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
157. KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 82.
158. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other Infrastructure
in the West Bank, 58 (June 2007).
159. Id. at 8, 19.
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tinian movement. Due to a closure regime that employs checkpoints, road blocks, and access permits, Palestinian entry to the
roads is limited. The physical presence of the roads often separate Palestinian communities into enclaves.160 This strengthens
Israel’s control of the territory and impacts the quotidian experience of much of the West Bank’s Palestinian population.161
Israel’s engagements with Article 43 are grounded within a
traditional interpretation of the occupation framework. They
build upon the prevalent supposition that prolonged occupation
justifies legislative management. The challenges posed by prolonged occupation require long-term solutions, attuned to the
evolving needs of the local population. Israel contends that if the
imposed initiatives provide for the local population, they are consistent with the legal framework.162 This interpretative approach acknowledges, but does not question, the nature of the
occupation. Formally, it professes to preserve sovereignty and
ensure local needs.
The High Court of Justice, however, has interpreted “local population” to include Israeli citizens who live within the West
Bank’s many settlements.163 This builds upon the Court’s early
judgment in the Christian Society case. Here, the Court understood Article 43 as compelling intervention into a range of sectors. Expansive legislative management was justified in response to the exigencies of prolonged occupation.164 In Electric
Company for the District of Jerusalem v. Minister of Defense,
however, the Court included the residents of Kiryat Arba within
its considerations. The occupying power was compelled to consider and ensure the needs of Kiryat Arba’s residents alongside

160. Id. at 58, 65 66.
161. Id. at 58. See also World Bank, Movement and Access Restrictions in the
West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy (May 9,
2007).
162. Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 13. See also HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik
Village Council v. Government of Israel, et al. 48(5) PD ¶ 34 (2004) (Isr.), translated in HCJ 2056/04
Beit Sourik Village Council et al. v. The Government
of Israel, et al., Judgement, HAMOKED, http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=6520 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Beit Sourik];
Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 221 22.
163. Electric Company, supra note 99. See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF
JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65.
164. Christian Society, supra note 94, at 582.
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the requirements of the Palestinian population.165 Eyal Benvenisti recalled how the Court’s decision provided the occupying
power with the necessary legislative competence to develop the
settlement enterprise.166 This facilitated the movement of the occupant’s population from Israel to the territories. It permanently
tilted the calculus that evaluated imposed measures to favor the
West Bank’s Israeli population.167
Proposals to alter the legislative competence of the occupying
power vary. Commonly though, contestations adhere to a nonnormative reading of the occupation framework. They accept, in
some cases as axiomatic, that the challenges created by the occupation’s duration must be managed.168 The European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) have reached similar conclusions.
In Demopoulos v. Turkey, the ECtHR addressed the admissibility of a property claim brought by a group of Greek-Cypriots.
In response to a 1974 coup, led by the Cypriot National Guard
and pro-unification supporters of Greece’s military junta, Turkey assumed control of the northern-third of Cyprus. Upon establishment in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) was widely recognized as an occupying power, a proxy
for Turkish control of the territory it had assumed.169 The TRNC
165. Electric Company, supra note 99, at 138. See also KRETZMER,
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 65.
166. See HCJ 5808/93 Economic Corporation for Jerusalem Ltd. v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria 49(1) PD 89 (1993) (Isr.) (Settlement development was further facilitated by the High Court of Justice’s position that engagements with Article 43 must acknowledge and address “changing conditions” within occupied territory. The Court ruled that settlements constituted
such change). See also KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at
215.
167. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 221 22.
168. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 120. See also
Harris, supra note 3, at 103; Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance, supra note
82, at 679.
169. Only Turkey has since recognized the TRNC. See Elihu Lauterpacht,
The Right of Self-Determination of the Turkish Cypriots, REP. TURK., MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 9, 1990), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chapter1.en.mfa. See also
Elihu Lauterpacht, The Status of the Two Communities in Cyprus, REPUBLIC
TURK., MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (July 10, 1990), http://www.mfa.gov.tr /chapter2.en.mfa. See also G.A. Res. 3212 (XXIX), (Nov. 1, 1974). See also G.A. Res.
3395 (XXX), (Nov. 20, 1975); See S.C. Res. 541, (Nov. 18, 1983) (examples of
the General Assembly and the Security Council denouncing the Turkish presence in Cyprus, rejecting resulting unilateral actions taken by Turkey, labeling
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introduced a pilot-judgment procedure to address property
claims by individuals displaced from Northern Cyprus.170 This
raised questions regarding the TRNC’s legislative competence.171 The ECtHR was asked to decide on the admissibility of
the applicant’s petition.172
The Court’s judgment was grounded in international human
rights law and the ECtHR’s admissibility requirements. IHL
scarcely featured within the decision.173 Yet the ECtHR
acknowledged the influence of the occupation’s duration. When
rendering its decision, the Court prioritized the need to ensure
the uninterrupted provision of individual rights by effectively
managing the status quo.174 Acknowledging the complexities
posed by duration, the Court held, “This reality, as well as the
passage of time and the continuing evolution of the broader political dispute must inform the Court’s interpretation and application of the Convention which cannot, if it is to be coherent and
meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances.”175
The ECtHR drew upon the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.176 South Africa assumed control of Namibia
during the First World War. This continued under the Mandate
system until the League of Nations was superseded by the

its presence as an occupation, and branding the TRNC’s declaration of independence as legally invalid). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 192.
170. Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. No. 46113/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 50 (2010)
[hereinafter Demopoulos]. For further context, see Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey,App. No. 46347/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 37 (2006).
171. See Demopoulos, supra note 170, ¶¶ 55, 63.
172. Id. (This case required the Court to determine whether the TRNC’s judgment procedure constituted a domestic remedy. The ECtHR held, for the purposes of admissibility, that the procedure created a local remedy and thus required exhaustion.).
173. Much of the discourse regarding both Northern Cyprus and Western Sahara is grounded within human rights law. See Bothe, supra note 40, at 1459.
174. See Demopoulos, supra note 170, ¶ 96.
175. Id. ¶ 85.
176. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 101 102 (2001)
(separate opinion by Palm, J.). See also Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J
Rep. 16, ¶ 125 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Opinion].
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United Nations.177 South Africa resisted the imposition of a trusteeship agreement and began a period of de facto administration.178 The ICJ’s Namibia Opinion facilitated the establishment
of the international community’s preferred management approach. Famously, it obliged the mandatory power to ensure the
daily administration of the controlled territory through the creation or maintenance of basic services. The ICJ held:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the people
of Namibia of any advantages derived from international cooperation. In particular, while official acts performed by the
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia
after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid,
this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for
instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the
effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory.179

The Court’s reasoning is inherently pragmatic. It seeks to preserve Namibian self-determination. Yet by instilling the notion
that the illegitimacy of foreign administration must not compromise the provision of local services, it has contributed to the entrenchment of the management approach.180
Neither the ECtHR or the ICJ engaged deeply with the legal
framework. Their decisions, however, provide credence to the notion that the occupation framework must only interpret occupation as a fact. Yet both Courts read this framework to address
the challenges spurred by an occupation’s duration. They provide weight to the belief that despite the acknowledged illegitimacy of the occupation regimes, the fact of occupation must be
managed. In response, the conservationist principle is amended
to meet the challenges of prolonged occupation.
177. See generally JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE:
DOCUMENTS AND SCHOLARLY WRITINGS ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SOUTH
AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1973).
178. See G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), (Oct. 26, 1966) (The General Assembly terminating the South African mandate and rejecting South Africa’s subsequent
claims). See also S.C Res. 246, (Mar. 20, 1969). See also BENVENISTI, supra note
8, at 3; Yaël Ronen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV.
201, 213 14 (2008).
179. Namibia Opinion, supra note 176, ¶ 125.
180. KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS UNDER
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 260 61 (2017).
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C. The Challenge of Security and Ensuring Public Order and
Safety
Following two decades of occupation, a banal event triggered
the First Intifada. An Israeli truck collided with a Palestinian
passenger van near the Jabalia Camp at the northern point of
the Gaza Strip. Four Palestinians were killed. Many Gazans believed the incident was in retaliation, a response to the stabbing
of an Israeli citizen days earlier.181 Mass demonstrations in
Jabalia, throughout Gaza, and then across the West Bank harnessed decades of Palestinian discontent and frustrated nationalist ambition. Israel’s engagements with the occupation framework shifted in response. Policies, professedly benevolent and
ostensibly intended to manage the occupation, were no longer
justified by appealing to local interests. Increasingly, Israel recalled the occupation framework’s security provisions to validate
its actions and policies within the West Bank.182
This justificatory transition reflects IHL’s dual purposes.183
The occupation framework’s myriad humanitarian assurances
are coupled with numerous security-based exceptions.184 Several
military manuals cite security as the most relevant justification

181. JEAN-PIERRE FILIU, GAZA: A HISTORY 199 (2014). See also Michael OmerMan, The Accident that Sparked an Intifada, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/The-accident-that-sparkedan-Intifada.
182. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 238 (noting that by the late 1980s and
the start of the First Intifada, Israel was unable to credibly cite the improvement of local interests as a motivating factor for the occupation’s policies).
183. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 16 17 (1st ed. 2014).
184. See, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, arts. 18, 35, 46, & 53
(For example, Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of public or private property, “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” Article 48 allows non-nationals of the occupied territory to depart from the territory unless, as per Article 35, their departure, “is contrary to the national interests of the state.” In
accordance with Article 18, parties to the conflict are required to indicate the
presence of civilian hospitals, “in so far as military considerations permit.” Under Article 46, individual or mass transfer is prohibited, however, the occupying power may “undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the
security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand”). See
Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 52 (Article 52 of the Hague Regulations permits requisitions in kind and service when required by the needs of
the army of occupation). See also Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 191.
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for the annulment or introduction of legislation within an occupied territory.185 An occupying power receives broad discretion.186 Under Article 27(4) of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
the occupier is entrusted with, “such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a
result of the war.”187 Efforts to balance the demands of military
necessity with the requirements of humanitarianism initially focused on conduct during general belligerency.188 Yet prolonged
occupation creates distance between the present and the triggering conflict.189
This distance poses questions regarding the function of the occupation framework. These query whether an occupation’s duration influences how the framework balances both military and
humanitarian considerations. They ask if duration tempers recourse to exceptions.190 A prolonged occupation as seen in the
185. See, e.g., U.K. Military Manual, supra note 12, at 286 88; U.S. DEP’T OF
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27 10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 143 (1956) (revised
1976), http://nile.ed.umuc.edu/-nstanton/FM27-10.htm. See also AraiTakahashi, Law-Making and Judicial Guarantees, supra note 136, at 1425.
186. See JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR: COMMENTARY 1, 339 (1958) (stating that, “Article 64 authorizes
the Occupying Power to subject the inhabitants of the occupied territory to
whatever measures it considers necessary for its own security and to ensure
that the present Convention is enforced and the territory properly administered”) [hereinafter PICTET, COMMENTARY].
187. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 27(4) (the Article
states, inter alia, that “the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of
control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a
result of the war”). See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note
22, at 112.
188. See generally Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretative
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L & POL. 831 (2010). See also Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance,
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795 (2010).
189. Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 189.
190. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 131 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall]; Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Written Statement of the Swiss Confederation, at 6, ¶ 26 (Jan. 30, 2004), https://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/131/1577.pdf [hereinafter Swiss Statement]. See also
F. Llewellyn Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace, 9
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West Bank, Northern Cyprus, and Western Sahara has moved
from a military contest and become an administrative relationship. Although this shift does not discount the possibility of security threats or periodic incidents of violence, recourse to military necessity and the security needs of the occupier become less
immediate.
Many articulations of the management approach begin from
the premise that the occupation’s duration presents challenges
that the legal framework is ill-suited to address. Efforts to manage these challenges and meet the needs of the local population
are heavily-weighted. Inversely, security or military necessitybased exceptions surrender much of their normative pull. Attempts to rebalance the military-humanitarian calculus represent yet another response to the challenges of prolonged occupation. Whether corresponding appeals propose strengthening humanitarian protection or (less commonly) assert broader security exceptions, they seek a better means of managing prolonged
occupation.
During proceedings for the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, the Swiss Confederation considered the
influence of duration on the relationship between military necessity and humanitarianism.191 Switzerland submitted that:
In the context of an occupation, international humanitarian
law ensures consistency between humanitarian aims and the
occupier’s security needs and reduces the risk of a deterioration
in relations between the occupying Power and the occupied.
Any examination of necessity and proportionality in circumstances of prolonged occupation when hostilities have ceased
must be more rigorous, since stricter conditions govern the imposition of restrictions in such circumstances on the fundamental rights of protected persons.192

Israel has not directly pursued justifications that rely upon the
unconventional view that an occupation’s duration expands the
occupier’s recourse to military necessity. Instead, the High
Court of Justice noted that “military and security needs predominate in a short-term military occupation. Conversely, the needs
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 149, 159 60; Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 96; Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 190 92.
191. Id. at 189.
192. Swiss Statement, supra note 190, at 6, ¶ 26. See also Koutroulis, supra
note 53, at 193.
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of the local population gain weight in a long-term military occupation.”193 Despite the Court’s conventional approach, Israel’s
presence within the West Bank brought mounting security challenges. Israel reverted to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. It
embraced a factual conception of occupation and appealed to the
exigencies of duration in response to these challenges.194
The promotion of safety, as per the English translation of Article 43, is commonly invoked to justify amendments to local legislation.195 In Ja’amait Ascan, the High Court of Justice claimed
that the establishment and scope of the military government’s
powers to manage “public order and safety” are influenced by the
occupation’s duration.196 The Court recalled the early work of
Doris Appel Graber. Reciting the consensus opinion that the occupation framework is ill-suited to regulate prolonged occupation, the Court claimed that, “this distinction between a shortterm military government and a long-term military government
has significant influence over the content which is to be infused
into securing “public order and safety.”197
The Court reached a similar determination in Abu Aita et al.
v. Commander of Judea and Samaria. It confirmed that duration influences the implied balance between military requirements and humanitarian considerations. Interpreting Article
43, the Court held:
It is true that this article contains no rules as to adjustment or
reclassification bound up with, or conditional upon the time element, but the effect of the time dimension is implicit in the
wording, according to which there is a duty to ensure, as far as
possible, order and public life, which patently means order and
life at all times, and not only on a single occasion. The element
of time is also decisively involved in the question of whether it
is absolutely impossible to continue acting in accordance with
existing law, or whether it is essential to adapt that law to new
realities. In the legal interpretation of Article 43, the relationship between the time element, and the form taken by the provisions of Article 43 is stressed more than once. It follows that
the time element is a factor affecting the scope of the powers,
whether we regard military needs, or whether we regard the
193. See Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 22. See also Koutroulis, supra
note 53, at 191 92.
194. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 238.
195. Boon, supra note 12, at 124.
196. Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 22.
197. Id.
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needs of the territory, or maintain equilibrium between
them.198

These decisions adhere to the prominent interpretation of the
occupation framework. They are premised upon and cite directly
from scholars who forward the prevalent view that, within prolonged occupation, the legal framework is unable to regulate the
needs of the occupier and the occupied. Without questioning the
nature or normative structure of the occupation, they offer a
means of better managing the challenges that result from prolonged occupation.
The implications of Israel’s expansive conception of the “public
order and safety” provision would, however, become apparent.
Despite the Article’s intended focus on the needs of the occupied
population, Article 43 was again interpreted to include the influx
of Israeli settlers that now resided in the West Bank.199 Initiatives, justified in accordance with the Hague Regulations, were
implemented to ensure the settler population’s security needs.
Often, this elevated the interests of the occupying power above
efforts to ensure the welfare of protected persons.200 As tensions
rose and the occupation endured, Israel employed initiatives and
policies that purported to manage the deteriorating security situation. A fence was erected around the Beit Hadassah building
in Hebron. It was justified as a security measure, necessary for
the protection of the Israeli families that had settled in the building’s upper stories. Its construction, however, restricted access
to the Palestinian-owned shops at ground-level. The Military
Commander declared the fence an essential security requirement.201 The High Court ruled that the Commander’s authority
to impose security-based policies extended to arrangements that
safeguarded the settler population.202
198. Abu Aita, supra note 103, at 133 34.
199. See Electric Company, supra note 99, at 138 (Ruling that the Israeli residents of Kiryat Arba were part of the local population for the purposes of Article 43’s positive provisions). See also Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 223.
200. Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 223 24.
201. Id.
202. See HCJ 72/86 Zalum v. Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria
Area 41(1) PD 528 (1987) (Isr.), translated in HCJ 72/86
Zalum et al. v.
Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area et al., Judgment,
HAMOKED, http://www.hamoked.org/files/2013/1158750_eng.pdf (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018). See also Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note
105, at 224.
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This reasoning has created an artificial distinction. It has diluted the restraining influence of Article 43. The legal regulation
of Israeli settlements and the needs of their population were
placed under the auspices of the occupation framework.203 Israeli
authorities consistently cited the challenges of prolonged occupation. They forwarded realist contentions regarding the nature
and demands of the occupation and in justification of policies imposed throughout the West Bank.204 These appeals were
grounded within an interpretation of the legal framework that
treats occupation, regardless of duration or cause, as a fact that
required regulation. Many Israeli initiatives were condemned.
The foundational interpretative approach assumed by both Israel and its detractors was, however, consistent. Divergences,
while significant and often framed as legal violations, primarily
concerned the most effective means of managing prolonged occupation.
III. THE NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH: ASSESSING
THE LEGALITY OF OCCUPATION
Despite its civilian presence, notwithstanding its increasing
control of the territory, Israel has refrained from claiming sovereignty of the West Bank. It has instead appealed to IHL in
justification of its settlement initiatives. Maiden development
projects were linked to Israel’s security apparatus.205 Later, following judicial intervention, settlement policy increasingly focused on the allocation of “public” land.206 Both approaches went
beyond the mere denial of the occupation framework’s relevancy.
Instead, Israel justified its settlement policy the source of

203. Kretzmer, Law of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 105, at 226.
204. Id.
205. See KRETZMER, OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 75 (explaining
that Under a Labour-led Government, Israel’s early approach to the settlements was largely, if not officially, premised on the Allon Plan. This favored
the retention of areas with low Palestinian populations in the West Bank that
would eventually host strategically-located settlements along the Jordan Valley and around Jerusalem.). See also SHLAIM, supra note 55, at 256 68. See
also KENNETH W. STEIN, HEROIC DIPLOMACY: SADAT, KISSINGER, CARTER, BEGIN
AND THE QUEST FOR ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE 168 69 (1999).
206. See HCJ 390/71 Izzat Muhammad Mustafa Duweikat v. Government of
Israel (Elon Moreh Case) 34(1) PD (1979) (Isr.). See also KRETZMER,
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 75 100; RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S
LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 17 48 (Inst. for Palestine Stud. ed., 1985).
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much international opprobrium as consistent with various provisions of IHL.
Israel presented expansionist interpretations of the occupation
framework’s military necessity and property provisions. It read,
restrictively, the framework’s humanitarian clauses and its prohibition on the transfer of civilian populations.207 These engagements are emblematic of what Aeyal Gross terms the “pick and
choose” approach. Israel selectively applies the occupation
framework, accepting the application of the Hague Regulations
and denying the formal applicability of the Geneva Conventions.208 This has allowed Israel to treat the West Bank as either
occupied territory under military control or as its own territory
where civilian laws are applicable to Israeli settlements.209
These selective appeals were often justified in tandem with
references to the occupation’s duration. They could not, however,
mollify the principal purpose of the occupation framework ensuring the inalienability of sovereignty. They failed to assuage
criticisms that Israel’s presence in the West Bank purposefully
impeded Palestinian self-determination. Contemporary manifestations of occupation, traditionally perceived as compatible
with self-determination, had altered. Since the era of decolonization, occupation was increasingly framed as a symptom of foreign domination.210

207. See Do Israeli Settlements Constitute an Obstacle to Peace?, ISR.
MINISTRY
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Dec.
30,
2009),
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/FAQ_Peace_process_with_
Palestinians_Dec_2009.aspx#Settlements3 (response to the widely-acknowledged interpretation that an occupying power is not permitted to settle its population within occupied territory, Israel reads Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention restrictively). See also Israeli Settlements and International
Law,
ISR.
MINISTRY
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Nov.
30,
2015),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israeli%20settlements%20and%20international%20law.aspx; ISRAEL SECTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 55 (1981).
208. GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL, supra note 7, at 45, 152. See also Aeyal
Gross, The Dual Legal System, Address at the Palestine-Israel Journal Conference (May 17, 2016), available at http://www.pij.org/TheDualLegalsystem.pdf.
209. GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL, supra note 7, at 162.
210. See Chinkin, supra note 54, at 168. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8,
at 17.
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The High Court of Justice addressed the void between Israel’s
appeals to specific Hague provisions and the framework’s guardianship of self-determination and sovereignty. In Saliman Tawfiq Ayub et al., v. Minister of Defense et al. (the Beth El Case), the
Court pondered, “how can a permanent settlement be erected on
land which was seized for temporary use only?”211 It accepted the
state’s position that “civil settlement may continue to exist in
that location only so long as the IDF holds the area by virtue of
the confiscation order.”212
The High Court of Justice has confirmed that an occupying
power does not assume sovereign prerogative.213 The Court recognized the corresponding requirement that an occupation must
remain temporary. It, however, coupled these pronouncements
with the declaration that “this temporariness may be longterm.”214 Israeli officials and the High Court referenced the legal
framework’s neutral conception of occupation and temporal neglect. They drew upon the prominent interpretative approach.
The Court contended, correctly, that “international law does not
set a time limit thereto and [the occupation framework] continues as long as the military government effectively controls the
areas.”215
Though this is an accurate reading of the occupation framework, it is ultimately incomplete.216 The prominent interpretative approach privileges considerations of the jus in bello. By embracing an interpretation that accentuates the framework’s durational neglect and uninterrupted relevancy, the requirement
of temporality is diminished. Legal considerations, expressing
jus ad bellum principles and conveyed by a holistic conception of
211. See HCJ 606/78 Saliman Tawfiq Ayub v. Minister of Defense (Beth El
Case) 33(2) PD at 14 (1978) (Isr.), translated in HCJ606/78, HCJ 610/78
Ayub et al. v. Minister of Defednse et al., Judgment, HAMOKED,
http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=3860 (last visited Oct. 31, 2018)
[hereinafter Beth El Case].
212. Id. at 14 15, 17. See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra
note 22, at 246.
213. See Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶¶ 8 12.
214. Id. ¶ 12. See also Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 166 67.
215. Ja’amait Ascan, supra note 146, ¶ 12. See Abu Aita, supra note 103, ¶
10 (noting that the authority of the Military Governor is temporary and lasts
for as long as military control is maintained in the relevant area. International
law sets no restrictions on duration). See also Beit Sourik, supra note 162 (The
Court reiterated the position that international law does not limit occupation.).
216. Giladi, supra note 21, at 284 85.
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temporality, are relegated alongside the normative pronouncements that they contain.217
Israel increasingly claimed that controversial and seemingly
permanent aspects of the occupation were, in fact, provisional.
This coupled appeals to specific allowances, often under the
Hague Regulations, with a limited conception of temporality.
Senior IDF officials testified that the construction of the West
Bank barrier was a “temporary fence erected for security
needs.”218 Settlements were described as non-permanent. Following Israel’s 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip, a group
of settlers challenged a legislative act that required the dismantlement and evacuation of several settlements in Gaza. Again,
the High Court stressed the temporary nature of the occupation
and the rules imposed by international law. The Court held,
most Israelis do not have ownership in the land on which they
built their homes and businesses in the evacuated area. They
acquired their rights from the military commander or from
those acting on his behalf. These are not the owners of the property, and they cannot transfer more rights than they have. 219

These contentions have created a judicially endorsed concept
of temporality that privileges a literal notion of non-permanence
above transitory characteristics.220 It is premised upon the prominent interpretation of the occupation framework. This continues to view occupation, regardless of its assumed form, as a factual phenomenon. While practice and commentary largely adhere to this interpretive approach, some have attempted to move
the resulting discourse beyond its traditional boundaries. They
have forwarded normative interpretations of the occupation
framework. These accentuate aspects of the framework that Israel’s faciliatory legal engagements sought to indefinitely defer
or failed to credibly address.
Aeyal Gross favors a normative conception of occupation. This,
Gross contends, is necessary to hold an occupying power accountable.221 As occupation is both a fact and a norm, it may not
continue indefinitely. Recognition of occupation’s normative
217. Id. at 247 48, 263 65.
218. Beit Sourik, supra note 162, ¶ 29.
219. See HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Beach Regional Council v. Knesset of Israel 59(2)
PD (2005) (Isr.). This aspect of the decision is recounted and discussed in,
DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 245 46.
220. See generally Koutroulis, supra note 53, at 167.
221. GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL, supra note 7, at 17.
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character based upon the requirement of temporariness and
the principle of sovereign preservation is necessary to maintain an occupation’s legitimacy. It is essential to ensure that imposed foreign control may not become indefinite.222 Gross correctly and convincingly recognizes how the occupation framework, traditionally interpreted, may prolong subjugation. The
pivot towards normative content becomes crucial when engagements with the occupation framework preference a factual conception that perpetuates or neglects the occupation regime’s sovereign encroachments.
Within the Palestinian territories, the resulting state of affairs
prompted Hani Sayed to propose a more radical departure from
the occupation framework. Sayed argues that the:
post Oslo regime of Israeli control over the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip is objectionable on normative grounds because it is
perpetuating Palestinian subordination and forcing on the Palestinians a particular unviable final settlement of the conflict
that is unrepresentative of the political dynamics inside the
Palestinian polity in the [West Bank and Gaza Strip], inside
the green line and in exile. The challenge is ultimately to imagine a legal framework for understanding the situation in the
[West Bank and Gaza Strip] that does not link the Palestinian
right to self-determination to the law of occupation. 223

Although Sayed does not fully articulate what form this framework would assume, he acknowledges the necessity of a normative focus and a shift from the traditional legal approach to occupation. Such a shift has now occurred. Departures from a
strict factual conception of occupation increasingly identify the
framework’s normative structure to assess the legality of particular forms of occupation.
A. The Illegality Approach
Recently, Michael Lynk, the UN’s Special Rapporteur to the
Palestinian territories, has urged the international community
to amend its legal treatment of prolonged occupation. Lynk as-

222. Id. at 3 4.
223. Hani Sayed, The Fictions of the Illegal Occupation in the West Bank
and Gaza, 16 OR. REV. INT’L L. 79, 126 (2014).
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serted that Israel’s occupation has, “become a legal and humanitarian oxymoron: an occupation without end.”224 Lynk cited the
prevalence of a factual conception of occupation. His report noted
that “the prevailing approach of the international community
has been to treat Israel as the lawful occupant of the Palestinian
territory. . . .”225 This, the Rapporteur suggested, had long become an inaccurate legal characterization.226 The report proposes a means of assessing when an occupation is rendered illegal.227
This draws upon a history of past practice. The international
community has, on several occasions, reached determinations of
illegality.228 The General Assembly described the Palestinian
territories as controlled through an illegal occupation.229 Since
the 1980s, however, these classifications of Palestine’s occupation have decreased. Elsewhere though, South Africa’s presence
in Namibia, Portuguese control of Guinea-Bissau, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait, and the
regular presence of Ugandan forces in Congolese territory have
been pronounced illegal.230
Such pronouncements prompted Yaël Ronen to identify the existence of a juridical category of illegal occupation.231 Ronen explains that an occupation becomes illegal upon violation of a
preemptory norm of erga omnes character.232 This acknowledgement, however, is not ubiquitous. Yoram Dinstein and Rosalyn
Higgins both suggest that there is a strong doctrinal basis for
the dismissal of the illegality claim.233 Dinstein argues that a
myth surrounds the legal regime of belligerent occupation. This
224. S. Michael Lynk (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. A/72/43106 (Oct. 22, 2017).
225. Id. ¶ 18.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Ronen, supra note 178, at 202.
229. See G.A. Res. 32/20, supra note 3, preamble. See also G.A. Res. 33/29,
preamble (Dec. 7, 1978); Ronen, supra note 178, at 216 21.
230. Ronen, supra note 178, at 213 16, 222 26 (for a detailed summary).
231. Id. at 203.
232. Id. at 206 08 (noting that this is often the prohibition on the use of force
or the violation of the obligation to respect the right of peoples to self-determination).
233. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement
of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1970).
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implies that a particular occupation is, or in time becomes, illegal.234 Alluding to the prominent interpretative approach, Dinstein asserts that “far from viewing belligerent occupation as innately unlawful, there is a whole body of international law regulating this state of affairs.”235
The dismissal of the illegality approach is facilitated by a factual conception of occupation. This moderates the significance of
the occupation framework’s normative requirements. By preferencing international law’s regulation of occupation, by privileging the view that the existence of an occupation is a neutral legal
phenomenon, the accompanying discourse remains fixated on
the means of management. This diminishes the significance of
the occupation framework’s fundamental purpose. Yet many of
the international community’s references to the illegality of a
particular occupation fail to articulate their legal reasoning.
The recent report by the Special Rapporteur did, however, present a normative framework to assess the legality of occupation.
The report prescribed that an occupant may not: (1) annex territory; (2) that an occupation shall remain temporary and not become permanent or indefinite; (3) that the best interests of the
occupied population guides the occupying power’s interventions;
and (4) that the territory must be administered in good faith and
in accordance with international law.236 An occupying power
whose administration breaches these identified principles
verges into illegality.237
These criteria draw heavily upon the work of Orna BenNaftali, Aeyal Gross, and Keren Michaeli.238 The authors propose identifying “a norm that governs the [occupation] phenomenon, differentiating between a legal and illegal occupation.”239
234. DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 34.
235. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, 43
U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 301, 313 14 (1994). See also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, LAW OF
OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 46.
236. See Lynk, supra note 224, ¶¶ 27 37, 42 (explaining that these principles
are derived from the ICJ’s Namibia opinion).
237. Id. ¶ 64.
238. Id. ¶ 27 (noting the additional influence of Aeyal Gross’ recent work and
Eyal Benvenisti’s contention that an occupant who stalls efforts to terminate
an occupation would be tainted with illegality. These are described as providing the “intellectual foundation” for the proposed criteria).
239. Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation:
Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 553
(2005).
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They identify three evaluative principles: (1) the notion that sovereignty or title does not vest in the occupying power; (2) the
maintenance of public or civil life by the occupying power in accordance with the principle of self-determination; and (3) that
occupation must be temporary and may not become either permanent or indefinite.240 Should the occupying power violate any
of these principles, the occupation becomes illegal.241
The desire to brand a particular occupation illegal, especially
one which is prolonged, reflects a perceived failure of law and an
accompanying sense of injustice. It is, however, worth recognizing a practical impediment. Applied to Israel’s occupation of the
Palestinian territories, a normative assessment of the occupation’s legality would likely be resisted by influential states.
Mainstream political and legal engagements with the conflict
are inherently pragmatic. Security Council Resolution 242, for
example, begins by emphasizing the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”242 Its enduring legacy, however, is
seen through its entrenchment of the land for peace formula.243
This provides a highly-incentivized calculation designed to both
encourage and guide negotiations.
The international community’s exchanges with the Israelis
and Palestinians are steeped in the custom, diplomacy, and law
that seek to manage this enduring conflict. A normative assessment of legality would likely struggle to influence this dominant
approach. As the international community continues to prioritize engagement, declared illegality would presumably be
viewed by, amongst others, the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom as facilitating isolation. Some may
see benefit in such a result. This would, however, be resisted by
dominant elements within the international community and, accordingly, raise questions regarding the approach’s effectiveness.
240. Id. at 553 55 (locating the “occupation within a normative framework
that differentiates between legality and illegality and may both resolve the
specific question of the legality of the Israeli occupation and redefine the contours of the legal discourse on occupation”).
241. Id. at 555, 559, 586 (the authors determine that the “Israeli occupation
. . . violates the three basic tenets of the normative regime of occupation and
is, therefore, intrinsically illegal”).
242. S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 1967).
243. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967 392 (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of Cal. Press,
2001).
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Considerations of effectiveness raise subsidiary questions. It
is unclear how a determination of illegality would alter subsequent legal engagements with the occupation regime. It is uncertain whether it would influence the application of the occupation framework. As Yaël Ronen notes, “for the category of illegal
occupation to be meaningful, it must have consequences that advance the removal of the illegality.”244 The Special Rapporteur
report suggests several such ramifications. These include encouraging member states and judicial bodies to prevent the cooperation of various entities that indirectly sustain the occupation.245 The report contends that a declaration of illegality would
“invite the international community to review its various forms
of cooperation with the occupying power as long as it continues
to administer the occupation unlawfully.”246
Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli suggest that normative results follow a declaration of illegality.247 Citing the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, they recall that conduct constituting an
internationally wrongful act must cease.248 They concede that
law does not replace statesmanship and cannot compel an occupation’s termination. The recognition of illegality may, however,
affect subsequent legal considerations including the occupying
power’s recourse to security measures and efforts to frame the
illegal occupation as an act of aggression.249
Declarations of illegality have been accompanied by the requirement to make reparations. This, too, is consistent with the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility.250 In the Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo case, the ICJ found Uganda liable
for its illegal presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and required the Ugandan Government to make reparations.251
244. Ronen, supra note 178, at 227.
245. Lynk, supra note 224, at 65.
246. Id.
247. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 612.
248. Id. See also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 88 91 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State
Responsibility].
249. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 612 13.
250. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 248, art. 31. See
generally Ronen, supra note 178, at 228 32.
251. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, supra note 21, at 257, ¶ 259, 279 83, ¶ 345.
See also S.C. Res. 674, ¶ 8 (Oct. 29, 1990) (compelling Iraq to compensate Kuwait, “as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation. . .”). See also Ronen,
supra note 178, at 228 29.
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This rebuked an illegal occupation. Confirmed illegality, however, is not a harbinger of legal consequence or sanction.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, the ICJ did not declare the Israeli occupation
to be illegal.252 Nevertheless, it acknowledged numerous violations of the occupation framework.253 This compelled legal redress. Israel was obliged to comply with and cease violations of
its international obligations.254 It was required to provide reparations, ensure restoration, and offer compensation to those impacted by the Wall’s construction.255 Referencing Barcelona
Traction, Light, and Power Co. Ltd., the Court found Israel to
have violated international obligations of an erga omnes character.256 The occupation did not require a declaration of illegality
in order for the Court to recognize violations that compel state
concern and protection.257 Where the Special Rapporteur report
called upon the international community to review its forms of
cooperation with the occupying power, so too did the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. The Court held that states were forbidden from
recognizing the situation resulting from the construction of a
wall. It stated that they may not render aid or assistance in
maintaining the existing status quo. Members of the international community held a positive duty to end impediments,
which stemmed from the wall’s construction, to Palestinian selfdetermination.258
It is unclear whether the categorization of illegal occupation
offers legal import not otherwise present within international
law. Violations of the occupation framework inevitably taint prolonged occupation. Prolonged occupation is defined by subsidiary
failures to adhere to various aspects of IHL. Common Article 1
of the Geneva Conventions requires High Contracting Parties to
“respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances.”259 The general rules relating to compliance with
252. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 552.
253. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 190, ¶¶
114 37.
254. Id. ¶¶ 149 50.
255. Id. ¶¶ 152 53.
256. Id. ¶ 155.
257. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
258. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 190, ¶ 159.
259. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 1.
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IHL fully apply to situations of occupation.260 These are not contingent upon the occupation’s legal status.
Significantly, the development of settlements is perhaps the
most controversial feature of the occupation. They are almost
universally viewed as a blatant violation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.261 They constitute a grave breach of the Convention
and are punishable under the Rome Statute.262 Again, the severity of these sanctions is not influenced by the occupation’s legal
status. Recourse to such sanctions, however, is contingent on political and diplomatic will. Appeals to state responsibility, to the
non-recognition of wrongful acts, or to reparations do not appear
more attainable if grounded in the illegality approach.
Declarations of illegality do, however, carry rhetorical weight.
Adam Roberts acutely observed that the categorization of an illegal occupation is “invariably used to refer to an occupation
which is perceived as being the outcome of aggressive and unlawful military expansion.”263 Often, though with exception, evocations of “illegality” are devoid of legal specificity. Perception,
however, is important. The legitimacy attributed to an occupation regime greatly influences the international community’s reaction to the occupant. It affects its treatment of the occupation.
A prolonged occupation will inevitably suffer a deficit of legitimacy. Yet the source of illegitimacy that shrouds Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories is largely derived from the
features of the occupation that themselves constitutes violations
of the legal framework. The continued expansion of settlements,
restrictions on the Palestinian right to self-determination, and
the chronic violation of human rights are both sources of illegitimacy and violations of the occupation framework. It is doubtful
that labeling the occupation illegal, in its totality, would alter or
lessen the legitimacy calculus of a reality that is already widely
denounced.

260. Bothe, supra note 40, at 1483.
261. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/225, ¶ 4 (Dec. 22, 2011) (167 in favor, 7 opposed,
and 6 abstentions).
262. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 900, 37 I.L.M. 999. See also Gilles Giacca, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in Occupied Territories, in THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1485, 1513 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta &
Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).
263. Roberts, Military Occupation, supra note 31, at 293.
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Determining when an occupation becomes illegal will remain
contested. Whether the implications of such a determination introduce otherwise unavailable legal consequences appears uncertain. It is improbable that the label of illegality will further
delegitimize an occupation already perceived as apocryphal.
This should not discount the value of the determination. BenNaftali, Gross, and Michaeli note that reaching an assessment
of illegality through a normative account of an occupation regime
allows the observer to move beyond obfuscation and
blurred boundaries.264 Israel’s myriad engagements with the occupation framework appeal to the indeterminacy that follows
from a factual conception of occupation. Infusing normative content into considerations of an occupation regime is essential to
gain legal clarity regarding the consequences of the occupying
power’s efforts to manage prolonged occupation.
Yet, as the ICJ claimed in its Namibia Opinion, “the qualification of a situation as illegal does not by itself put an end to it. It
can only be the first, necessary step in an endeavor to bring the
illegal situation to an end.”265 In accordance, efforts to meet the
challenges of prolonged occupation should neither seek complete
disassociation from the existing legal framework nor attempt to
effectively manage the ongoing situation within the existing
framework. Rather, they should embrace the occupation framework’s normative content. These efforts must move to identify a
legal basis to encourage the termination of prolonged occupation.
IV. FROM MANAGEMENT TO TERMINATION: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO PROLONGED OCCUPATION
In the ICJ’s 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall, Judge Elaraby offered a commonsense observation. Tasked with determining the legality of Israeli actions and policies, Judge Elaraby simply concluded, “the
only viable prescription to end the grave violations of international humanitarian law is to end the occupation.”266 As the occupier becomes increasingly distant from the interests that led
to the occupation’s initiation, as the occupied population faces
264. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 609.
265. Namibia Opinion, supra note 176, ¶ 111.
266. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 190, at
256 (separate opinion of Elaraby, J.).
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growing subjugation and the continued suspension of their civil
and political rights, the reality of prolonged occupation unavoidably fosters continued violations of international law.
The benevolent occupier may successfully provide basic social
or economic rights. The occupation framework, however, is
structurally precluded from addressing many of prolonged occupation’s inescapable challenges. Consequentially, myriad responses to these challenges attempt to circumvent the framework. Political, diplomatic, and grassroots initiatives often favor
ending the occupation. International law, however, remains fixated on an unattainable status quo. Guided by the prominent
interpretative approach, these legal appeals endeavor to better
regulate the present so as to preserve the past.
Attempts to manage prolonged occupation may be benevolent.
They may come in response to undeniable challenges that demand redress. They also, however, promote an interpretation of
the occupation framework that perpetuates occupation. This
prominent interpretative approach allows an occupying power to
strengthen its control of the territory and of the population.
Commonly and regardless of intention or motive, responses to
prolonged occupation contort the legal framework. They expand
its provisions. In response to prolonged occupation, they claim
latitude, while pledging fidelity to a factual, alegal conception of
occupation that may continue indefinitely.
Instead, responses to prolonged occupation must embrace a
normative reading of the legal framework. They must situate
their engagements, their management efforts, in an interpretative approach that identifies and accentuates a holistic conception of temporariness. This is intended to move from responses
that produce perpetual management. The interpretative approach proposed here remains cognizant of both the occupation’s
duration and the form that it assumes. The proposed interpretative approach harnesses a good faith obligation to terminate prolonged occupation. This must be preferred to interpretations
whose silence on the question of duration facilitates the selective
employment of international law, the perpetual management of
identified challenges, and, by design or by default, the eventual
entrenchment of foreign control.
This proposed shift, taken under the framework’s auspices and
cognizant of its confines, cannot unilaterally terminate occupation. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli are correct. International
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law does not replace diplomacy.267 Yet it may facilitate or hinder
its efforts. The interpretative approach offered here recognizes
that engagements with the occupation framework are premised
on a choice. This is between a factual, alegal conception of occupation and one that rests on normative acknowledgements regarding the nature and purpose of occupation. Further, it is
amongst legal appeals that rely exclusively upon the jus in bello
and those that additionally acknowledge the relevancy of the jus
ad bellum. Engagements based on the latter interpretation are
more likely to constrain the occupation regime. They are better
equipped to safeguard the preservation of sovereignty, maintain
competing relations, ensure the occupying power’s military
needs, and protect the occupied population. Legal appeals,
grounded in this interpretative approach, are more consistent
with the spirit of IHL and the principles espoused by the jus ad
bellum.
The proposed good faith approach to enable termination provides an alternative path. This is based on a normative recognition. It places the principle of temporality at the center of the
legal regulation of occupation. Adherence to this approach will
facilitate three objectives. These collectively strengthen international law’s relationship with prolonged occupation. First, it will
recognize the significance of the interpretative choices that
structure subsequent legal engagements with prolonged occupation. These reflect either an unconstrained or temporal conception of occupation. Such interpretative choices are further
grounded within either exclusive appeals to the jus in bello or
those engagements that draw upon a wider array of principles
that exist in both IHL and the law governing the use of force.
Next, it will appeal to the notion of good faith to accentuate the
principle of temporariness and the objective of termination. This
provides a more efficacious means of structuring and evaluating
the legal regulation of prolonged occupation. Finally, it will contribute to a necessary shift in legal discourse. This shift follows
the direction of diplomatic appeals by preferencing calls to terminate prolonged occupation above attempts to manage its unconstrained duration.
The interpretative approach proposed here links engagements
with the legal framework to the framework’s fundamental pur-

267. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 612 13.
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pose ensuring temporality. Appeals to identified tenets of international law facilitate a reemphasized interpretation of the
occupation framework’s normative structure. This can moderate
the framework’s lax temporal dimensions by elevating the innate requirement to enable the occupation’s termination. Such a
reading of the occupation framework will provide a clear legal
basis requiring an occupying power to delimit actions that perpetuate occupation. And it will preference interim initiatives,
taken to address the challenges of prolonged occupation, that
may stretch the framework’s conservationist origins but do not
frustrate the requirement to enable termination. This alternative reading of the occupation framework is firmly grounded in
international law.
A. Recognition of an Interpretative Choice
Many of Israel’s engagements with the occupation framework
are conventional. Ostensibly, they draw upon a widely endorsed
interpretative approach.268 This prominent approach and the responses to prolonged occupation stemming from it are, however,
the result of a deliberate choice. This exists between readings
that emphasize the framework’s lax temporal limitation and
those that accentuate a holistic conception of temporality.269 Adherence to the prominent interpretative approach is influenced
by the traditional distinction between the jus ad bellum and the
jus in bello. Devoid of context, these choices constitute accurate
readings. The occupation framework privileges temporariness
and fails to ensure precision.270 In practice, however, these interpretative approaches become antinomies. They allow Meir
Shamgar to claim that an occupation may continue indefinitely
and they support Lassa Oppenheim’s contention that “there is

268. See GREENSPAN, supra note 133, at 225 26. See also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 126, at 12 (both for early examples of such endorsements).
269. See ICRC Expert Meeting, supra note 39, at 74 (for an example of the
former). See also FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 3 4 (1863) (for an example of the
latter) [hereinafter Army General Order 100].
270. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6. See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 3.
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not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of an occupying
power.”271
Shamgar’s interpretative choice enabled the legal architecture
of Israel’s occupation.272 Distinguishing between “political problems” and the “observance of the humanitarian provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention,” the then Attorney General delineated considerations of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. 273
This distinction is firmly grounded within international law.274
The collective legal treatment of war separates the regulation of
the use of force from the means by which force is used. Israel has
elsewhere cited the importance of this distinction.275
Traditionally, the exclusive legal treatment of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello ensures that the latter applies regardless of the former’s assessment. This was conveyed, in relation
to occupation, by an American Military Tribunal at Nuremburg.
In the Hostages Trial, the Tribunal submitted that:
international law makes no distinction between a lawful and
an unlawful occupant in dealing with the respective duties of
occupant and population in territory. There is no reciprocal
connection between the manner of the military occupation of
territory and the rights and duties of the occupant and population to each other after the relationship has in fact been established. Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal is not an
important factor in the consideration of this subject. 276

The separate and non-contingent application of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello was read into Common Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions. This requires High Contracting Parties to

271. See Shamgar, Legal Concepts, supra note 72, at 43. See also Lassa Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants, 33 LAW Q. REV. 363, 364 (1917).
272. GROSS, WRITING ON THE WALL, supra note 7, at 3.
273. Shamgar, Observance of International Law, supra note 68, at 266.
274. Giladi, supra note 21, at 250.
275. See THE STATE OF ISR., THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DECEMBER 2008 18
JANUARY 2009: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS, ¶ 35 (2009).
276. See Hostages Trial, supra note 21, at 637. See also Re Christiansen, 15
I.L.R. 412, 413 (Holland, Special Court of Arnhem, 1948) (The following year a
Dutch Special Court ruled, “The rules of international law, in so far as they
regulate the methods of warfare and the occupation of enemy territory, make
no distinction between wars which have been started legally and those which
have been started illegally.”). See also DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 3.
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“respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”277 The distinction received explicit recognition in
the preamble to the First Additional Protocol. Accordingly, the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol “must
be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction
based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict. . . .”278
As Yoram Dinstein explains, “the law of belligerent occupation
is a branch of the jus in bello.” The rights and obligations attributed to the occupying power are not altered by “the chain of
events in which the belligerent occupation was brought
about.”279 This is reflective of strong policy considerations.280 It
is grounded within the realist contention that despite war’s prohibition, armed conflict continues to occur. War’s inevitability
compels legal regulation and humanitarian moderation.281 In
practice, however, the distinction between the jus ad bellum and
the jus in bello becomes absolute. It is interpreted to require “a
total normative separation.” The norms of one regime may not
affect the “validity, application, compliance, or interpretation of
the other.”282
The duality of international law’s relationship with armed conflict is deeply rooted in the legal orthodoxy that regulates occupation. Rotem Giladi has termed this the “total separation paradigm.“283 This distinction “prohibits answering IHL questions
by recourse to jus ad bellum issues. It assumes that the jus in
bello is neutral or autonomous.”284 Political or diplomatic consid-

277. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, arts. 1 2 [emphasis
added] (A similar distinction was derived from the wording of Common Article
2 which held that the “present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared
war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties. . . .”). See also Giladi, supra note 21, at 251.
278. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) preamble, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
279. DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 3.
280. See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, supra note 21, at 321, ¶ 58. See also
Giladi, supra note 21, at 257 61. See also MARCO SASSÒLI AND ANTOINE A.
BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 103 (2d ed. 2006).
281. Giladi, supra note 21, at 258.
282. Id. at 262.
283. Giladi, supra note 21, at 263.
284. Id.
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erations regarding the nature or status of the occupation are discounted by engagements grounded in IHL. The legal regulation
of occupation is distinguished from politicized considerations
that contest the cause, effect, and legitimacy of occupation.285
The influence of this rigid distinction is evidenced by the general
reluctance of humanitarian and legal organizations those otherwise consumed with tempering and critiquing occupation to
refrain from assessing the occupation’s legality. Accordingly, legal approaches deemphasize temporality’s significance. The pursuit and fulfillment of termination becomes the concern of the
political sphere.
Strict adherence to the total separation paradigm is, however,
an interpretative choice. It facilitates the prominent approach to
prolonged occupation. Grounded in the jus in bello, this preferred reading portrays occupation as fact. Subsequent considerations fixate on duration but neglect the fundamental principles
that are compromised when the character of an occupation alters
to become a form of quasi-permanent control. Accompanying legal engagements neglect the occupation’s origins. They do not
engage with causes of occupation or those influences that contribute to its continuation. These factors queries concerning
the occupation’s duration remain within the political sphere.
They are beyond the reach and relevancy of IHL. As the ICRC
expert panel noted, since IHL did not impose formal limits on
the occupation’s duration, it is incapable of preventing prolonged
occupation.286 An unconstrained notion of occupation supersedes
temporariness. It becomes the function of international law to
manage, not resolve, occupation.
The implications of this interpretative choice neglect the primacy of temporality. They negate its prominence within the occupation framework and they abandon its relevance to foundational considerations of the jus ad bellum. These are unnecessary concessions. While aspects of prolonged occupation will demand management, it need not come at the expense of broader
considerations. Though the occupation framework is correctly
assumed to form part of the jus in bello, this does not discount
the continued significance of the jus ad bellum.

285. Id. at 264.
286. ICRC Expert Meeting, supra note 39, at 74.
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Commentators have long-acknowledged the simultaneous relevancy of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.287 Christopher
Greenwood notes, “while the former will always operate before
the latter comes into play, once hostilities have commenced it is
necessary to consider both. The relationship between them thus
becomes of considerable importance.”288
Rotem Giladi extends this reasoning to the case of occupation.289 While the applicability of the occupation framework continues without distinction, “jus ad bellum considerations . . . play
an important role in bringing about and shaping specific cases
of occupation.”290 Giladi convincingly illustrates how the phenomenon of occupation requires reference to the jus ad bellum.
The occupation framework is bound in duality. It is concerned,
“like other IHL norms, with the humane treatment of individuals. It also uniquely addresses questions of governance and sovereignty.”291 Accordingly, the norms of occupation are reliant
upon the norms of the jus ad bellum.292 This reliance is reflected
in the occupation framework’s prohibition of annexation.293 As
Giladi explains, “the prohibition on annexation is still implicit in
the transient, alegal nature of the occupation, but at the same
time also serve to ensure the preservation of world order by removing one legal incentive for war.”294
An interpretative choice that preferences a factual conception
of occupation neglects the centrality of jus ad bellum norms. Responses to prolonged occupation that favor management while
remaining silent on temporality surrender a principal function
of the occupation framework. This implied deference is unnecessarily dismissive of the position that temporariness holds within
the occupation framework and of the centrality that jus ad bellum norms claim both within general international law and for
the legal regulation of occupation. Instead, a revised interpretative approach to the legal treatment of prolonged occupation
287. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 222 (1983) [hereinafter Greenwood, Jus ad Bellum Jus in Bello]. See also, Giladi, supra note 21, at 266 67.
288. Greenwood, Jus Ad Bellum Jus In Bello, supra note 287, at 222.
289. Giladi, supra note 21, at 266 85.
290. Id. at 268.
291. Id. at 298.
292. Id. at 268.
293. Bothe, supra note 40, at 1461.
294. Giladi, supra note 21, at 274.
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should opt to accentuate the principle of temporariness and the
subsequent requirement to enable occupation’s termination.
B. Accentuating Temporariness and a Good-Faith Standard to
Terminate Prolonged Occupation
On the eve of the occupation’s fifth decade, a Military Appeals
Court in the West Bank ruled that it possessed the authority to
review the compatibility of military orders with the law of occupation. The Court pronounced that the occupation framework
was “the grundnorm of the occupation regime, and judicial review was the only check against [the] unrestrained exercise of
power by the military commander.”295 Elsewhere, Martti
Koskenniemi described the High Court of Justice’s reliance upon
the principle of proportionality as constituting “the Grundnorm
against which the activities of the occupation authority must be
measured.”296
Identifying a basic norm reflects the interpreter’s conception
of what the occupation framework should achieve. It constitutes
how the framework should be understood. To be effective to accurately capture the spirit of IHL and the purposes of the jus ad
bellum this determination must not be influenced by a factual,
indefinite conception of occupation. Instead, the proposed good
faith approach to enable termination offers an alternative foundation. It is structured around two interconnected elements: the
understanding that occupation constitutes a provisional state
and the principle of good faith. These two factors collectively
support the proposed interpretative shift. They identify and accentuate the principle of temporariness and invoke fundamental
norms of international relations.

295. See Mil. Appeal 5/06 Military Court of Appeals (Judea & Samaria), Eran
Schwartz v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Religion (Sept. 17, 2006), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), translated in Eran
Schwartz v. the Commander of IDF Forces in the Region, at 11 12, INT’L COMM.
RED
CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihlnat.nsf/caseLaw.xsp?documentId=61C330FB85F051E1C12575BC00429F83&action=openDocument&xp_co
untrySelected=IL&xp_topicSelected=GVAL-992BUG&from=state (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 326 (referring to the Appeals Board decision).
296. Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone
A Zone of Reasonableness?, 41
ISR. L. REV. 13, 18 (2008).
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Temporality’s identification is not innovative. The notion that
occupation constitutes a provisional state remains undisputed.297 Article 55 of the Hague Regulations holds that an occupying power assumes the status of a temporary administrator.298
With reference to the objectives of the conservationist principle
and the purposes of Article 43, the ICRC Commentaries define
an occupying power as “merely being a de facto administrator.”299 The 2015 Clapham Commentaries simply note that “occupation is a temporary situation, not equivalent to annexation.”300 Eyal Benvenisti surmises that “because occupation does
not amount to sovereignty, the occupation is also limited in time
and the occupant has only temporary managerial powers, for the
period of time until a peaceful solution is reached.”301
The prominent normative approaches proposed elsewhere recognize temporariness’s centrality. This is reflective of temporality’s ubiquity. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli acknowledge
that “the temporary, as distinct from the indefinite, nature of
occupation is thus the most necessary element of the normative
regime of occupation.”302 The consequences of the approach proposed here, however, diverge from the foundational normative
and non-normative approaches identified elsewhere.
The abovementioned approaches associate the failure to ensure temporality with declared illegality. The proposed approach, however, imposes a positive obligation the enablement
of termination. It articulates a means of shifting the international legal discourse from the prominent, management-focused
approach to an understanding that better responds to the altered form of control that prolonged occupation represents. Referencing the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the illegality

297. See Orna Ben-Naftali, PathoLAWgical Occupation: Normalizing the Exceptional Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Other Legal Pathologies, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 129, 159 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). See also Malcolm Shaw, Territorial
Administration by Non-Territorial Sovereigns, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY
AND SUBSIDIARITY 369, 381 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
298. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 55 (The Article governs
the use of private property.).
299. See PICTET, COMMENTARY, supra note 186, at 273.
300. See Bothe, supra note 40, at 1460.
301. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6.
302. See Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 599.
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approach notes the obligation to cease wrongful acts.303 While
this is a compelling legal argument, to extend its relevancy beyond a particular, recurring violation of the occupation framework, requires a holistic understanding of temporality.
The proposed good faith obligation to enable termination provides this. It acknowledges that temporality is defined both by
duration and the character of the occupation. The illegality approach offers a more limited notion of temporality that is linked
to the occupation’s duration. Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli
call upon the international community to establish a clear durational limitation. An occupation exceeding one year, they suggest, be transferred to an international authority.304 Further, the
qualification of an occupation as “illegal” does not affect the continued application of the occupation framework.305 This maintains the risk of perpetual management. The proposed approach
provides a means of coupling the employment of the occupation
framework with a holistic conception of temporality that is conscience of and responsive to the form that the occupation has
assumed.
Temporality’s prominence reflects both political and humanitarian purposes. These are crucial features of international law’s
relationship with occupation. They are expressive of the norms
governing relations amongst states and between nations and individuals. Accordingly, employment of the occupation framework must embrace this holistic conception of temporariness. It
must harness these grander meanings and preference a reading
that facilitates the objective of termination. Engagements with
the occupation framework, in response to prolonged occupation,
must accentuate both this principle and reflect its origins and
purposes.

303. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 248, art. 30. See
also Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 599.
304. Id. at 613.
305. Id. at 612.

2018]

Moving from Management to Termination

175

1. The Political and Humanitarian Purposes of the Occupation
Framework Are Premised on a Holistic Notion of Temporality
The legal construct of occupation developed as a rejection of
conquest.306 International society discounted the validity of sovereign title that historically followed debellatio. Occupatio bellica became an intermediate status. It recognized a military authority’s territorial control and began establishing a temporary
regulatory framework. This framework provided that an occupying force would administer the territory “on a provisional basis,
but has no legal entitlement to exercise the rights of the absent
sovereign.”307
The emergent principle that “belligerent occupation is in essence a temporary condition in which the powers of the belligerent occupant are not without limit” was initially codified in
Francis Lieber’s General Order No. 100.308 Further articulation
and codification followed. A host of military manuals acknowledged a temporary conception of occupation. This temporal conception informed, and was formalized by, the international lawmaking initiatives of the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.309 These efforts continued to premise occupation’s regulation upon the notion of a durational limitation. They infused
both political and humanitarian objectives into international
law’s relationship with the occupation of foreign territory.310
Temporality undergirds initiatives to both preserve sovereignty
and to protect a vulnerable population subject to foreign control.
Sovereignty’s divergence from the historical right to conquest
necessitated the construction of a provisional phase. This existed
during the period between when a foreign state established control of a hostile’s territory and when the belligerents completed
a peace treaty determining the territory’s status. This tempo-

306. See Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied With Occupation, supra note 5, at 54
56. See also SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT TO CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1988).
307. Bhuta, supra note 9, at 725 26.
308. See Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 65, 87 (2003). See also Army General
Order 100, supra note 269, at 4.
309. Imseis, supra note 308, at 87 92.
310. As such, these alternative purposes may be conveyed, as in tension. See
Cohen, supra note 28, at 502 20 (contrasting a humanitarian conception of the
law of belligerent occupation with a realist or Schmittian reading of the law).
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rary state was to ensure that “de facto power did not immediately translate into de jure sovereignty, conquest, and subjugation.”311 Though the occupation framework’s origins reflected the
desire to preserve European order, the notion that occupation
constituted a provisional, de facto phenomenon privileged sovereign preservation.
The prioritization of European order waned. Global initiatives
structured the community of nations around the principles of
sovereign equality and the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force.312 Temporality assumed a constitutive function.
It facilitated many of the foundational principles of international
order. These principles received expression within the occupation framework. Prominently, temporality is reflected in the
framework’s prohibition of annexation.313 This remains part of
customary international law and receives articulation within
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Amongst States.314
Temporality is reflected in the rules regulating an occupier’s
authority. These rules establish the occupier as an administrator whose power is derived from its factual presence not its sovereign entitlement.315 The requirement to preserve existing legislation articulated within Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention both constitutes and is reliant upon the principle of temporality.316
Engagements with prolonged occupation that accentuate temporality better represent the political objectives conveyed within
the occupation framework. They are reflective of fundamental
international norms. Temporality’s relationship with and sup-

311. Id. at 503.
312. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 4. See also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex,
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
313. Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws
of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 580, 582 85 (2006) [hereinafter
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation].
314. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶4. See also Declaration on Friendly Relations,
supra note 312.
315. See Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 313, at
585 86.
316. Id. at 586 89.
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port of these norms go beyond political considerations and structural components of the jus ad bellum. It is expressive of the occupation framework’s humanitarian purposes. Temporality constitutes a requisite condition of the framework’s jus in bello function.
The occupation framework’s humanitarian purpose has become paramount. Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes the status of protected persons.317 The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described the Convention’s “object and purpose” as safeguarding those individuals
“who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and . . . are not subject to the allegiances and control, of the State in whose hands
they may find themselves.”318 Humanitarian requirements are
imbued throughout the Convention.319 Benvenisti remarked that
“the very decision to dedicate the Fourth Geneva Convention to
persons and not governments signified a growing awareness in
international law of the idea that peoples are not merely the resources of states, but rather that they are worthy of being subjects of international norms.”320
These developments, however, proceeded sequentially. The
Hague Regulations made minimal reference to explicit humanitarian requirements.321 Nevertheless, the early willingness to
deny an occupying power sovereignty forbade foreign control
from becoming a means to subjugate a local population. The limitation of the right to conquest, through the temporal conception
of occupation, accompanied the increasing humanization of conflict. Gregory Fox describes this lineage. The law governing occupation, “emerged in the late eighteenth century as a humanizing trend in the law of war, modifying a state’s previously unencumbered right to subjugate conquered foreign territories.”322
Though the use of force maintained legitimacy, these modifications tempered a foreign power’s rule. By establishing occupation as a temporary phenomenon, contingent upon a negotiated
317. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 4.
318. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 168
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). See also Cohen,
supra note 28, at 509 10.
319. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, arts. 27 33.
320. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 106 (1st ed.
1993) [hereinafter BENVENISTI 1st ed.]. See also Cohen, supra note 28, at 508.
321. Id. See also Meron, supra note 29, at 245 46.
322. See Fox, supra note 10, at 228.
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agreement, regulatory attempts endeavored to modify the
“harsh but common consequences of foreign control over territory.”323
The humanitarian purpose of the occupation framework
evolved in tandem with the legal regulation of war. Now, an occupying power assumes responsibility for an array of humanitarian considerations. These directly influence the lived experiences of the occupied population. Corresponding humanitarian
considerations are privileged by contemporary readings of the
occupation framework.324 The management approach, ostensibly, endeavors to ensure humanitarian requirements. It seeks to
fill a void. This exists when the needs created by an occupation’s
duration exceeds the allowances that an occupying power may
take to fulfill its humanitarian obligations. The ability of the occupied population to fully address their humanitarian needs to
fulfill their political, economic, and cultural wants through the
realization of self-determination becomes contingent upon the
principle of temporality.325
The occupation framework embodies international norms. It
sets particular objectives. These are widely acknowledged. They
contend that occupation is not equivalent to annexation. The legal framework imposes duties of good governance and humanitarian concern upon the occupying power. And it provides the
occupying power with specified allowances to ensure its military’s wellbeing and to provide effective administration of occupied territory.326 Again, each of these principles are contingent
upon temporality.

323. Id.
324. See generally Meron, supra note 29.
325. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 83, preamble (This emphasized “the right
of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control
their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as
soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly. . . .”). See also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 319 (1995); Eyal Benvenisti, The Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution 1483 on Iraq
in Historical Perspective, 1 IDF L.R. 19, 36 (2003).
326. See, e.g., Bothe, supra note 40, at 1460. See also BENVENISTI, supra note
8, at 6 7; EYAL BENVENISTI, MAX PLANK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (s.v. “occupation, belligerent,” 2009); Ben-Naftali et al.,
supra note 239, at 554 55.
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The purpose here is not to reiterate these principles. Their existence is not in doubt. The purpose here, instead, is to preference an interpretation of the occupation framework that accentuates a holistic, not merely durational, notion of temporality. It
is to disentangle prolonged occupation’s treatment from the
prominent interpretative approach. Attempts to manage prolonged occupation continue to cite, or are premised upon, an interpretation that emphasizes the absence of a firm durational
limitation. Engagements that appeal to the management approach do not question whether initiatives taken under the
framework’s auspices are conducive with enabling the occupation’s termination. They deemphasize a central and constitutive
purpose of the occupation framework ensuring an occupation’s
temporality. For if an occupation is to constitute a temporary
state, if sovereignty will revert, if the occupying power is to serve
as a trustee and not a sovereign, then the occupation must end.
While the framework may be silent on the chronology of such
termination and an exclusive focus on the question of duration
may support the position assumed by Yoram Dinstein, the ICRC
expert meeting, and others to permit that such silence equates
to or facilitates the implied permanence of prolonged occupation
would render the entire framework an absurdity.
2. Termination Is the Necessary Corollary of Temporality
When the Namibian Mandate terminated, South Africa was
deprived of the international recognition that legitimized its control as a Mandatory Power. The Mandate’s termination, however, did not compel South Africa to vacate the foreign territory.327 The proposal presented within these pages does not purport to exact occupation’s termination. It is mindful of international law’s limitations.328 The proposal recognizes that the occupation framework cannot coerce an occupying power to end its
prolonged control of foreign territory when a predetermined
threshold is reached.
As noted, such determination is not suited to a fixed chronological scale.329 Yet, when the situation on the ground becomes

327. Ronen, supra note 178, at 215 16.
328. Boon, supra note 12, at 110 12.
329. There should, of course, be no doubt as to whether Israel’s presence
within the West Bank satisfies this classification.
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one where neither The Hague Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention can competently protect sovereignty or effectively balance the relationship between the occupier and the occupied, resulting legal engagements must recognize that the occupation has or risks becoming indefinite. The proposed approach wishes to reject the creeping prevalence of an indeterminate conception of occupation. By moving from a factual, unconstrained notion of occupation, this favored interpretation links
the principle of temporality to its inevitable corollary, termination.
The requirement to cease unlawful activity is firmly grounded
in international law. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility
compel an offending party to end unlawful activity and provide
assurances of non-repetition.330 This suggests that a state, occupying foreign territory without legal justification, is required to
immediately terminate the occupation.331 Calls for cessation are
often contingent upon the perception that an occupation is itself
illegal.332 Yaël Ronen illustrates, however, that such declarations are themselves predicated upon acknowledgement of violations that affect the constitutive nature of the occupation regime. Accordingly, “the cessation of a violation necessarily
means termination of the occupation.”333
In its Namibia opinion, the ICJ required South Africa to withdraw from and end its occupation of the administered territory.
Again, this decision was reliant upon the Court’s determination
of illegality.334 Similarly, the international community often
predicates calls to terminate occupation on the assumption of illegality.335 A declaration that an occupying power is obliged to
end its territorial control follows, as Benvenisti suggested, the

330. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 248, art. 30.
331. Olivier Corten, The Obligation of Cessation, in OXFORD COMMENTARIES
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 545, 545
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
332. Ariel Zemach, Can Occupation Resulting from a War of Self-Defense Become Illegal?, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 313, 316 17 (2015).
333. Ronen, supra note 178, at 228.
334. Namibia Opinion, supra note 176, ¶ 133. See also S.C. Res. 301, ¶ 6 (Oct.
20, 1971); Ronen, supra note 178, at 228.
335. Ronen, supra note 178, at 228. See also G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII), ¶ 3
(Nov. 2, 1973); S.C. Res. 661, at 19, 20 (Aug. 6, 1990).
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burden to resolve the underlying political stalemate.336 This determination is influenced by the perceived legitimacy of the occupation.
Such perception, however, does not reactively prompt a declaration of illegality. The international community has not reverted to the determinative language that the General Assembly
employed in the late 1970s when describing the Israeli occupation.337 This has prompted the Special Rapporteur’s recent initiative to establish a framework assessing occupation’s legality.
As noted, the Rapporteur’s report accurately observed that “the
prevailing approach of the international community has been to
treat Israel as the lawful occupant of the Palestinian territory.”338
The interpretative approach presented here separates the objective of termination from assessments of legality. This distinction is motivated by the abovementioned apprehensions concerning the illegality approach.339 The proposed approach does not
deny that an occupation may be, or may become, illegal. It instead recognizes that a determination of illegality, within a context as fraught as Israeli-Palestinian relations, is inseparable
from politics. To move beyond the political resistance that would
accompany such a declaration, to bypass the pragmatic challenges of selecting which individuals or what mechanisms possess the authority to render such a determination, the proposed
approach embraces the more modest standard of enabling the
occupation’s termination. This requirement is associated not
with the occupation’s legal status, but with its duration and
form.
Despite the prevalence of the management approach, the requirement to enable an occupation’s termination is indicative of
international will. Notwithstanding the common association between termination and illegality, calls to conclude occupation
are not dependent on the occupation’s legal status. Following the
U.S. and British occupation of Iraq, the Security Council held
that the Iraqi right to self-determination was contingent upon

336. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 244.
337. See G.A. Res. 32/20, supra note 3, preamble. See also G.A. Res. 33/29,
supra note 229, preamble.
338. Lynk, supra note 224, ¶ 18.
339. See supra Part III.A.
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the occupation’s expeditious termination.340 Termination thus
becomes the necessary fulfillment of the occupation framework’s
fundamental purposes. It is the prerequisite of the principle
pacta sunt servanda.341
Linking the enablement of termination to temporality provides
an objective. If an occupant is determined to violate international law, it provides a subsequent step a means of redress
that is not immediately conveyed by the illegality approach. Devoid of a legal determination, it acknowledges that termination
is not merely a means to rectify a legal wrong. It is a positive
requirement compelled by the occupation framework’s normative purpose. This durational limitation is effectively absent
from the prominent interpretative approach, which maintains
that nothing under IHL prevents an occupant from embarking
on a long-term occupation.342
Temporality’s dependency on termination reiterates an inescapable truth. This holds that the principles conveyed by the occupation framework preserving sovereignty, safeguarding local needs, ensuring self-determination prevent an occupation
from becoming prolonged. These principles are contingent on the
basic norm of temporality and the fulfillment of this primary requirement compels termination. To avoid perpetual management, to better capture the spirit of IHL, an amended interpretative approach that accentuates temporality and preferences
termination may derive faciliatory support from the principle of
good faith.
3. The Relevance and Potential of the Principle of Good Faith
In 1973, largely in response to Israel’s continuing occupation
of the Palestinian territories, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3171. The resolution supported the rights of peoples living under foreign occupation to “regain control of their natural
resources.”343 Eyal Benvenisti remarked that Resolution 3171
conveyed that an occupying power may not purposefully delay a

340. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 83, preamble. See also Lynk, supra note
224, ¶ 32.
341. Corten, supra note 331, at 545 46.
342. ICRC Expert Meeting, supra note 39, at 74.
343. G.A. Res. 3171, (Dec. 17, 1973).
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conflict’s peaceful settlement. It may not perpetuate occupation.344 The occupant, Benvenisti noted, “has a duty under international law to conduct negotiations in good faith for a peaceful
solution.”345
The second element of the proposed interpretation appeals to
the principle of good faith. This reinforces an amended normative approach that views temporality as a basic norm and termination as an objective imbued throughout the occupation framework. Within the Israeli-Palestinian context, the notion of good
faith often appears as a rhetorical device. It assumes the form of
a loaded allegation that both parties enthusiastically accuse the
other of lacking.346
Alongside this popular usage, the principle of good faith has
become an evaluative criterion. It provides a standard of compliance against which an occupation’s legality is assessed. Proponents of the illegality approach link determinations of malfeasance to particular violations of the occupation framework.347
Commonly, these violations amount to de facto annexation. They
manifest through the refusal to “engage in good faith negotiations toward ending the occupation.”348 Benvenisti has long contended that an occupant, acting in bad faith to stall an occupation’s termination, becomes an aggressor and is tainted with illegality.349
The present invocation of good faith, however, assumes a more
fundamental purpose. It protects against the misuse of international law. It ensures that legal interpretations and engagements with the occupation framework maintain consistency
with the framework’s ostensible purposes.350 Good faith is firmly
344. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 245.
345. Id.
346. See, e.g., JAMES L. GELVIN, THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR 240 41 (2007) (for a broader use of the notion of good
faith in the formal peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).
347. See Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 239, at 553 55. See also Ronen, supra
note 178, at 206 08; Lynk, supra note 224, ¶¶ 27 37.
348. Zemach, supra note 332, at 316.
349. See BENVENISTI 1st ed., supra note 320, at 215. See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 245 46.
350. This foundational legal requirement is expressed through the rule, pacta
sunt servanda, and is codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. This is described as a cornerstone of international relations.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, T.S. No.
58, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See also MARK E.
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rooted in international law and underpins many preeminent legal rules.351 It is expressive of the international community’s desire to preserve order and avoid arbitrariness and chaos.352 In its
Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ explained that, “One of the basic
principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation,
in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is
becoming increasingly essential.”353
The good faith principle governs the conduct of international
negotiations. It requires, “negotiating in a way that is likely to
yield an agreement.”354 The ICJ further elucidates. The Court
has explained that good faith negotiations must demonstrate
willingness to contemplate alternative proposals, avoid preconditions, and accept assistance from third-parties.355 This is supportive of the view, expressed by Benvenisti and others, that bad
faith conduct compels illegality. However, the good faith obligation to enable termination does not purport to oblige negotiations. It does not assess the legality of an occupation regime. Instead, this proposal recognizes that responses to the challenges
posed by prolonged occupation are the result of interpretative
discordance between a temporal understanding of occupation
VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 363 (2009).
351. The duty to act in good faith is found in Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter,
Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention, and in the preamble to the Declaration on Friendly Relations. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 2; Vienna Convention, supra note 350, arts. 26 & 31; Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra
note 312, preamble. See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment,
1957 I.C.J. Rep. 9, 48 (Jul. 6) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.) (Judge Lauterpacht held that, “Unquestionably, the obligation to act in accordance with
good faith, being a general principle of law, is also part of international law.”).
See Lynk, supra note 224, ¶ 35 (The Special Rapporteur report noted that the
principle of good faith is a cornerstone principle of the international legal system and of all legal relationships in modern international law).
352. See Steven Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, 2 BONN RES.
PAPER PUB. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2013).
353. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 49 (Dec.
20).
354. Barry O’Neill, What Does it Mean for Nations to Negotiate in Good
Faith ?, CTR. INT’L SECURITY & COOPERATION, STAN. U. 2 (2001), available at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/goodfaith5.pdf.
355. Id. See also The Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 142 (Sept. 25).
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and one that accentuates the framework’s failure to assert a firm
durational limit. It is between a factual and a normative conception of occupation. And it contests an alegal and an illegal vision
of the occupation regime.
Each interpretative account is premised upon a particularized
reading of the occupation framework. Despite temporality’s incontestability, despite its embodiment and expression of the occupation framework’s constitutive norms, it continues to be relegated through an interpretative approach that views occupation as an unconstrained fact. A reading of the occupation framework that appeals to the requirements of good faith is better situated to emphasize temporality’s preeminence. It better facilitates an interpretative approach that, recalling Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, accentuates the “object and purpose” of the
occupation framework.356 The proposed approach creates a link
between a treaty’s interpretation and its performance.357 It
clearly articulates the claim, established within the occupation
framework, that temporality is contingent upon termination.
Such an interpretation offers a more purposeful reading of the
occupation framework and a more efficacious means of engaging
with the myriad challenges posed by prolonged occupation.
4. Ensuring an Effective Safeguard Against Misuse
The desire to move from a factual, unconstrained notion of occupation and the corresponding management approach does not
discount the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. These
challenges are real and often urgent. As noted, occupations traditionally conclude when the fortunes of war are altered or upon
a negotiated agreement.358 The good faith obligation to enable
termination seeks to facilitate the latter. In the West Bank, the
first traditional means the changing fortunes of war is improbable due to Israel’s disproportionate military strength.
Equally, it is undesirable in a region plagued by instability and
violence. Yet it is these regional realities that heighten the risk
of an already prolonged occupation continuing indefinitely. An
occupying power, disinclined to withdraw from territory and
harboring security-based apprehensions, is unlikely to make
356. Vienna Convention, supra note 350, art. 31.
357. VILLIGER, supra note 350, at 425.
358. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 47. See also DINSTEIN,
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 271 72.
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concessions that stray from its immediate interests. An occupied
population, politically divided and hamstrung by ineffective
leadership, will struggle to represent its constituent’s objectives.
The approach proposed here presupposes that temporality
compels termination. The posited interpretation is immediately
concerned with ensuring that the legal framework is not interpreted to facilitate occupation or resigned to its perpetual management. It recognizes that an adjustment to the occupation
framework will not usurp geopolitical and regional dynamics
and simply compel an occupation’s termination. Thus, certain
management is inescapable. It is a required means of ensuring
the interests of a population bereft of political and economic autonomy. It is obliged by the occupation framework.359 In accordance, the enablement of termination becomes an accompaniment
to and an objective of management initiatives. The proposed interpretative shift intends to alter understandings of the legal
framework so that termination moves from the background to
the forefront of relevant legal engagements. Thus, the objective
of termination becomes a bulwark against initiatives masquerading as management efforts and compelled by the occupation’s
duration that frustrate, rather than facilitate, the principle of
temporality.
The proposed imposition of a check is not novel. Often, however, the prescribed restraint accompanies engagements with
prolonged occupation that adhere to the prominent interpretative approach. This permeates much of the academic literature.
The aforementioned “inherent dilemma” concerning the latitude required to effectively treat prolonged occupation often
fails to link purported management initiatives with the principle
of temporality or the obligation to terminate occupation.
In as early as 1942, E.H. Feilchenfeld argued that an occupying power may disregard the conservationist principle by providing “appropriate justification.360 This would provide the occupying power with what Feilchenfeld believed was the necessary latitude to address the economic challenges of prolonged occupation. Yoram Dinstein proposed a litmus test. It is axiomatic, Din-

359. See BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 6. See also Roberts, Military Occupation, supra note 31, at 295 (Both Benvenisti and Roberts capture this purpose
of the occupation framework by defining the occupying power as serving as a
trustee for the limited duration of the occupation.).
360. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 126, at 89.
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stein held, that an occupying power requires increased legislative latitude to effectively manage prolonged occupation.361 Misuse, however, could not be discounted. If the occupying power
truly requires further legislation to meet the needs of the occupied population, if it endeavors to successfully manage the prolonged occupation, it must, Dinstein concluded, exhibit a similar
(legislatively enacted) concern for its own population.362 In Abu
Aita, the High Court of Justice adopted Dinstein’s litmus test.363
The Court held that imposed initiatives, ostensibly intended to
benefit the local population, were valid if “the military government is filled with the same concern in regard to its own people
and applies the same measures taken in the area of military government in its own area.”364
Subsequent efforts to both increase and regulate the legislative latitude received by an occupant maintained fidelity to the
prominent interpretative approach. These initiatives rarely
linked the proposed means of preventing abuse with the principle of temporality. Adam Roberts, for example, acknowledged
the need to amend the occupation framework. Such alterations
would, however, be susceptible to misuse. To safeguard against
potential abuse, Roberts favored limiting particular allowances
while extending only those deemed necessary to effectively manage prolonged occupation.365
Similar proposals followed. The scholarly treatment of prolonged occupation offered an array of regulatory methods. These
intended to both better manage occupation and safeguard
against legislative overreach by the occupying power. Marco

361. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 22, at 120.
362. Id. at 121. See also Yoram Dinstein, The Legislative Power in Administered Territories, 2 TEL AVIV L. REV. 505, 511 (in Hebrew) (1972); BENVENISTI,
supra note 8, at 92 (In accordance, the existence of a law in the occupant’s own
territory will provide evidence of the lawfulness of a similar law’s introduction
within the occupied territory. Both Dinstein and Benvenisti note, however, this
may only serve as a prima facie test that requires specific examination within
a particular case.).
363. See Abu Aita, supra note 103, at 5, 135 36.
364. Id. (Justice Shamgar, delivering the judgment, concluded, as had Dinstein, that this criterion was not exhaustive. This reflected the belief that circumstances may arise where “conditions in a territory and special circumstances demand legislative steps not required at the time, or at all, in the home
country.).
365. Roberts, Prolonged Occupation, supra note 11, at 51, 53.
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Sassòli proposed appealing to the Security Council.366 Eyal Benvenisti suggested a consultative process that solicits local participation and input.367 While Benvenisti’s response lends a degree
of democratic legitimacy to the management process, others seek
a broader international mandate. Richard Falk has proposed the
development of an international convention. If an occupation
continues for ten years, the convention would direct the management of the prolonged occupation and safeguard local interests.368 Similarly, Brian Walsh and Ilan Peleg call for the creation of an “occupation document.“ To effectively manage prolonged occupation, the proposed mechanism would identify imposed foreign control as a “special legal condition which requires
specific legal doctrine designed to meet the needs of an occupation.”369 Effective management is derived from human rights
law. This, according to Walsh and Peleg, balances protections
that safeguard the local population and the occupier’s right to
pursue genuine security interests.370
Other proposals indirectly allude to temporality’s importance.
Most often, though, these fail to reference the requisite criterion
of termination. Proponents of a self-determination-based standard, such as Alain Pellet, acknowledge the discordance between
the legal framework and the challenges posed by prolonged occupation. This discordance compels initiatives to better facilitate
effective management. Pellet asserts that “humanitarian” responses, necessary to address these challenges, are lawful to the

366. To prevent abuse, the UN body would evaluate and authorize necessary
departures from the occupation framework to ensure the required management initiatives. See Sassòli, Article 43, supra note 126, at 15 16. See also David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842, 843 (2003) (offers a similar appeal in relation to the U.S. and British-led occupation of Iraq
and “transformative” occupations more broadly).
367. BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 146 247. See Christopher Greenwood, The
Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 241, 264 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992) (offering a similar suggestion in relation to local governance).
368. See Falk, supra note 49, at 45 47 (suggesting the creation of an internationally supervised plebiscite or a mechanism to evaluate whether the law governing belligerent occupation remains relevant).
369. Brian Walsh & Ilan Peleg, Human Rights Under Military Occupation:
The Need for Expansion, 2 INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 62, 62 63 (1998).
370. Id. Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 885
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 317, 329 (2012) (for an example of similar proposal to
Walsh and Peleg).
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extent that they do not threaten the occupied population’s right
to self-determination.371
Considerations of an occupying power’s legislative discretion
consistently fail to build upon an interpretation of the legal
framework that accentuates temporality. This process begins before an occupation becomes prolonged. Scholarly deliberations
concerning how and when an occupant may introduce legislation
remain within the direct wording of Articles 43 and 64.372 Legislation may be introduced to maintain order, to ensure the safety
of the occupant’s military forces, or to realize the legitimate purposes of the occupation.373 Subsequent efforts to reconcile the
framework’s conservationism with prolonged occupation followed this approach. They permit expansive authority to better
manage the exigencies of prolonged occupation but fail to couple
these allowances with the principle of temporality or the requirement to enable termination of prolonged occupation.
The proposed good faith approach offers an alternative. It insists that initiatives, undertaken for the ostensible benefit of the
local population, must remain consistent with the occupation
framework’s purposes. These must not compromise a notion of
temporality that is cognizant of the foundational norms that this
principle encapsulates. Instead, they must enable its termination. This is justified by a simple assumption. This holds that
responses to the challenges posed by prolonged occupation are
most effective when premised upon temporality. That the interests of the occupied population, the requirements of the occupying power, and the demands of international order are best satisfied when occupation terminates. Too often, the international
law governing the phenomenon of occupation preferences a factual, unconstrained notion of occupation. Where diplomatic appeals and the principle of self-determination have constantly
called for the occupation to end, international law is largely silent. The good faith approach to enable termination seeks to
371. Alain Pellet, The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 169,
192, 201 02 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
372. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 5, art. 42. See also Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 34, art. 64.
373. See generally LORD ARNOLD D. MCNAIR & ARTHUR D. WATTS, THE LEGAL
EFFECTS OF WAR (4th ed. 1966). See also BENVENISTI, supra note 8, at 91 92;
GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY
ON LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 97 (1957); Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance, supra note 82.
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more accurately represent the spirit of IHL. It wishes to realign
legal appeals with the principle of self-determination and diplomatic calls for the conclusion of prolonged occupation.
C. Aligning the Occupation Framework with Diplomatic Appeals to Terminate Prolonged Occupation and the Principle of
Self-Determination
Shortly following the 1967 War, the Security Council gathered
in New York. On November 22, it adopted Resolution 242. The
Security Council cited the illegality and inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by force.374 It directly referenced the recent war. Continuing, the resolution famously affirmed that the
establishment of a “just and lasting peace” required Israeli withdrawal from the recently occupied territories.375 The termination
of belligerency was premised upon respect for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and political independence of all states in
the region.376 The resulting “land for peace” formula compelled
the nascent occupation’s termination and the normalization of
relations.377 This formula became the foundation of the diplomatic approach to the enduring conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians.
A decade later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat journeyed to
Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset. A new era of optimism
was heralded. Sadat declared that “peace cannot be worth its
name unless it is based on justice, and not on the occupation of
the land of others.“378 The Egyptian leader evoked the international consensus that had developed around Resolution 242. Sadat pronounced that the call for a “permanent and just peace,
based on respect for the United Nations resolutions, has now become the call of the whole world. It has become a clear expression
of the will of the international community. . . .”379 The following
374. S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 1967).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See Bruce D. Jones, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Wars: Responsibility Without Power, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 298, 308 (Vaughn
Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
378. Anwar Sadat, Egypt President, Address at the Israeli Knesset (Nov. 20,
1977), reprinted in THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: A DOCUMENTARY
RECORD 1967 1990 136, 139, 142 (Yehuda Lukacs ed., 1992).
379. Id.
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year, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords. A framework for Middle East peacemaking was reestablished. Palestinian autonomy would be implemented over five years. Transitional arrangements would be negotiated. Upon Palestinian selfgovernance, Israel was required to withdraw from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.380
Similar optimism accompanied Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat on the White House lawn in 1993. The symbolism of an Israeli Prime Minister embracing the hand of a Palestinian Chairman was momentous. The era of Oslo and the Declaration of
Principles again premised a negotiated peace upon Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian self-governance.381 Yet optimism would
flounder following an intifada, a series of deadly wars in Gaza,
and the continued entrenchment of Israel’s civilian presence
throughout the West Bank. Still, however, the international
community remains steadfast. It continues to insist that Israel
end its occupation of the Palestinian territories.
Since at least 1980, the international community has referenced the prolonged character of the occupation. It has directly
appealed to Israel to end its control of the West Bank and Gaza.
Security Council Resolution 476 cites the “overriding necessity
to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by
Israel since 1967.”382 Similar calls have become ubiquitous.383
From widely endorsed UN resolutions to the activist’s placard,
appeals to terminate the occupation are ever-present. Yet international legal engagements, premised on the prominent interpretive approach, assume that the occupation’s duration is neither limited nor affected by the occupation framework. Alternative interpretations that draw upon occupation’s normative
character find that an occupation regime violates fundamental
principles of the legal framework. Often, the occupation is declared illegal. It is unclear, however, whether this declaration

380. A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Isr.-Egypt, Sept. 17, 1978,
1136 U.N.T.S. 196, in THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: A DOCUMENTARY
RECORD 1967 1990 155, preamble, sec. 1 (Yehuda Lukacs ed., 1992).
381. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
Isr.-P.L.O., art. 1, 7(2), Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
382. S.C. Res. 476, ¶ 1 (June 30, 1980).
383. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 71/23, (Nov. 30, 2016). See also Lynk, supra note 224,
¶ 15.
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triggers legal consequences not otherwise elicited by the underlying violation(s). It is not immediately apparent what subsequent steps follow declared illegality.
Both interpretative approaches diverge from the international
community’s affirmed diplomatic course. The proposed good
faith approach to enable termination offers an alternative. It
better represents the spirit of IHL. It aligns the occupation
framework with the prominent diplomatic treatment of the occupation. International law is understood to inform diplomatic
engagement. Though it may not always be a decisive factor, “the
rules of international law frequently [provide] the framework in
which diplomatic negotiations, arguments, and positions [are]
formulated.”384 International law shapes the content of and the
positions offered in “multilateral forums and in bilateral diplomatic representations.”385 As observed throughout the IsraeliPalestinian conflict “the long-term framework for [normalizing]
relations between hostile actors” has been articulated in a legal
vernacular and imposed through numerous diplomatic initiatives.386
To influence and support diplomatic initiatives, international
law must be effective. The international law of occupation, as
prominently interpreted, threatens to frustrate the principles
espoused by the international community. These principles directly align with the occupation framework’s normative character. Yet, they are continuously neglected by an interpretative approach that is either resigned to benevolent attempts to humanize a purportedly unalterable situation or vulnerable to manipulation. International law, the former Secretary General Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar declared, must become more effective in governing international relations. It must not “stagnate but keep
pace with change in the conditions of international life. . . . It
must evoke a shared understanding and it must be seen to derive from the morality of international behavior.”387
384. ANDREW JACOVIDES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY: SELECTED
WRITINGS BY AMBASSADOR ANDREW JACOVIDES 234 (2011).
385. Francois O. Wilcox et al., International Law in Diplomacy, 77
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 99, 100 (1983).
386. Tom Farer, Diplomacy and International Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MODERN DIPLOMACY 493, 493 (Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine &
Ramesh Thakur eds., 2013).
387. See Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the
University of Bordeaux (Apr. 24, 1991), in Press Release, Secretary-General’s
Statement at University of Bordeaux, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/4560 (1991).
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General Assembly Resolution 44/23 announced the “decade of
international law.“388 The General Assembly spoke of the need
to strengthen the “rule of law in international relations.“389 It
reaffirmed the role of international law in promoting the “means
and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes between
states.”390 The proposed good faith approach facilitates the alignment of legal and diplomatic discourses. In accordance with the
demands of the international community and the constitutive
principles upon which they draw, engagements with the occupation framework that accentuate temporality are better suited to
present termination as the required means of preserving sovereignty, protecting local interests, and ensuring self-determination. An occupying power may not legitimize initiatives that appeal to the occupation’s duration but do not enable its termination. An interpretative approach that acknowledges occupation
as fact and merely seeks to manage its effects compromises international law’s efficacy and thus its relevancy.
Diplomatic appeals to terminate occupation are often
grounded in the principle of self-determination. Building upon
Palestinian nationalism and the spirit of Camp David, formal
appeals to self-determination accompanied American and Egyptian calls to terminate the occupation.391 The principle of selfdetermination vests in Article 1 of the UN Charter.392 It is confirmed in both the international human rights covenants.393 Its
normative development, however, corresponds with the era of
decolonization. Self-determination would associate with statebuilding initiatives.394 These advancements, however, proved
difficult to reconcile with the occupation framework’s conservationist design. The law of occupation is described as antithetical
388. G.A. Res. 44/23, preamble, ¶ 2(b), (Nov. 17, 1989).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See NATHAN THRALL, THE ONLY LANGUAGE THEY UNDERSTAND: FORCING
COMPROMISE IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 22 (2017).
392. See U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2 (states that the purpose(s) of the United
Nations are to, “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . .”).
393. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1., Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also, International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.
394. Manuela Melandri, Self-Determination and State-Building in International Law: The Need for a New Research Approach, 20 J. CONFLICT. & SEC. L.
74, 83 (2015).
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to state-building initiatives.395 Several have questioned its compatibility with the principle of self-determination.396
This poses an important distinction. Consideration of self-determination’s compatibility with the occupation framework followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This debate largely focuses
on the phenomenon of transformative occupation.397 The notion
of state-building evoked by this context differs from that discussed within this article. The proposed normative reading of
the occupation framework is applicable to transformative occupations. This, however, raises various issues that are beyond the
current scope but will be considered elsewhere. The form of control exhibited by prolonged occupation differs from that of transformative occupation. It is employed for alternative purposes
and serves distinguishable ends.
Since Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem, calls for Palestinian statehood increasingly appeal to self-determination.398 This provides
a legal basis that favors the termination of occupation. Marco
Sassòli notes that the fact of occupation may be construed as incompatible with the right to self-determination.399 Palestinian
statehood, the two-state solution, and the realization of self-determination compels, and is contingent upon, termination. The
occupation framework, traditionally conceived, does not facilitate this process. Sassòli explains that the right to self-determination cannot be implemented by an occupying power. To ensure
self-determination, Sassòli continues, an occupying power need
not legislate. Instead, it must withdraw.400
The consequences of the right to self-determination and the
objective of the proposed interpretative approach are identical.
Each identify termination as a constitutive requirement. Yet,
adherence to the non-normative interpretative approach poses a
conflict. Though Sassòli acknowledges that the fulfilment of selfdetermination compels cessation, this is described as an issue of
395. Nigel D. White, Settling Disputes: A Matter of Politics and Law, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS: READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 61, 70
(Wouter Werner, Marieke De Hoon & Alexis Galán eds., 2017). See also Melandri, supra note 394, at 82 85.
396. Melandri, supra note 394, at 83. See also Steven Wheatley, The Security
Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 531
(2006).
397. See generally Fox, supra note 10. See also Cohen, supra note 28.
398. THRALL, supra note 391, at 22.
399. Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance, supra note 82, at 677.
400. Id.
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the jus ad bellum. The self-determination argument “cannot be
used to deny an occupying power the right to legislate under the
jus in bello.”401 The proposed approach does not suggest the revocation of an occupant’s legislative competence. It, however,
aligns the purposes of the occupation framework with the right
to self-determination. By acknowledging the relevancy of jus ad
bellum norms by insisting that termination is the corollary of
temporality, the proposed approach wishes to insulate the occupation framework. It intends to ensure that the law of occupation does not become an anachronism; that it is not dismissed in
favor of more efficacious legal approaches that better align with
prevailing normative standards or diplomatic objectives. This
does not require radical restructuring. But it compels a recommitment to the object and purpose of the occupation framework.
The proposed interpretative approach operates within the confines of international law. Accordingly, it remains susceptible to
many of its weaknesses.402 Little here will move the hardened
skeptic to reconsider the viability of international law and its
place within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet it is important
to recognize even upon such dismissive terms that simply rejecting the role assumed by international law as inept underestimates how the prominently interpreted occupation framework
perpetuates occupation.
Still, one is entitled to wonder whether the proposed interpretative approach fares better than the specific provisions contained within the occupation framework. This, however, misunderstands the purpose of the approach. The proposed interpretive approach is not intended to replace treaty-based provisions.
Instead, it wishes to complement them. Employment of the good
faith obligation does not compel a choice between specific provisions and fundamental norms. The conformity of settlement development, for example, may be evaluated in accordance with
both Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention but also with
broader legal considerations. As presently interpreted, the occupation framework engages with the symptoms of prolonged occupation. A non-normative interpretation of the legal framework, confined to management, does not acknowledge or address
the altered form of control that a prolonged occupation imposes.

401. Id.
402. See Boon, supra note 12, at 110 12.
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The proposed approach facilitates engagement with the causes
of this control.
Settlement construction perpetuates, and thus prolongs, occupation. Beyond Article 49(6), settlement construction may be
construed as an act of aggression.403 The perpetuation of occupation, the altered form of quasi-permanent control that prolonged
occupation has become may be understood to contravene Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. The occupation framework will contribute to a discourse grounded in uncontested principles regarding the use of force, the annexation of territory, and the realization of self-determination that resonate with and within international society.404
When the Cypriot government remonstrated with the international community, it called for the termination of Turkey’s occupation of the northern-third of its territory. It did not, however,
emphasize the occupation framework.405 It spoke clearly of occupation and invoked international law. The Cypriot government
coupled calls to terminate the occupation with the principles of
the jus ad bellum.406 It appealed to the prohibition of the use of
force in international relations. It employed human rights
law.407 Such foundational principles of international order vest
within the occupation framework. They are inherent to the principle of temporality and their assurance logically compels termination. Should an occupying power choose to pursue permanent
control, the proposed normative approach will strip away the façade provided by a factual conception of occupation. It will pivot
the accompanying discourse from perpetual management to termination. And it will facilitate appeals to fundamental norms,
neglected by the prominent interpretative approach, but which
constitute cornerstones of the international order.

403. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art 3(a), annex (Dec. 14, 1974).
404. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 271 349 (2010).
405. See, e.g., Latest Developments, CYPRUS MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.,
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2016.nsf/mfa09_en/mfa09_en?OpenDocument
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
406. See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Cyprus to the U.N., Letter Dated May 29,
2001 from the Permanent Rep. of Cyprus to the United Nations Addressed to
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/55/970-S/2001/541 (May 31, 2001).
407. JACOVIDES, supra note 384, at 234.
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CONCLUSION
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank has now reached fifty
years in duration. It demonstrates little prospect of subsiding.
Within this occupied landscape, strong legacies have been
forged. These extend from clearly identifiable spaces that constitute settlements and their associated infrastructure to the increasingly fraught relations between the Israelis and Palestinians who live amongst these spaces settler and indigenous; occupying power and protected person; other and other. IHL and
the occupation framework are intended to manage these relations and confront their potential legacies so as they do not become eternal features of the conflict. With the passage of time,
however, and the construction of a status quo, the traditional
occupation framework has proven incapable of regulating the inevitabilities and challenges of prolonged occupation.
The proposals within this article, of a good faith obligation to
enable termination, of a holistic notion of temporality, offer an
amended normative approach. This approach is grounded in
general principles of international law. It exclusively focuses,
however, on the obligations of the occupying power. This is not
intended to discount or undervalue the role the Palestinians and
their leadership in Ramallah must assume to facilitate the occupation’s termination and the normalization of relations with Israel. Instead, this singular focus acknowledges the position of
strength that an occupying power assumes. Over the course of
prolonged occupation, Israel’s presence has become entrenched.
As such, it faces a significant burden and responsibility in realizing the occupation’s termination. The good faith obligation attempts to ensure that the occupying power is unable to apply the
existing framework so as to indefinitely defer the consequences
of this burden.
Naturally, this only represents a point of departure within the
confines of international law. Many questions remain and untold
obstacles will present. The good faith obligation to enable termination does not represent the extent to which the occupation
framework requires reevaluation. Nor has this article considered all of the shortcomings or challenges of international law’s
relationship with prolonged occupation. Instead, the approach
proposed here recognizes how a factual or alegal conception of
occupation threatens the fundamental principles conveyed by
the framework itself. In response, the good faith obligation is intended to challenge the legally manufactured status quo that
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has facilitated the occupation’s duration. It must, however, remain conscious of its own limitations and recognize that international law an amended legal framework or normative structure does not provide all of the answers to the challenges or
unintended consequences presented by prolonged occupation
and entrenched conflict. Yet it may better contribute to their redress.
In relation to the West Bank, this is particularly pertinent.
Many in Israel have long recognized that the occupation presents a self-imposed existential dilemma. This stems from the
demographic realities of the West Bank’s Palestinian population, which with the Palestinian citizens of Israel, will eventually become a majority. The consequences of this were succinctly
conveyed by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: “As long
as in this territory west of the Jordan River there is only one
political entity called Israel it is going to be either non-Jewish,
or non-democratic.”408
The traditional occupation framework allows this dilemma to
remain unaddressed. It facilitates a status quo that is viewed as
indeterminate and legally neutral but in which specific violations, like settlement construction, create a far more powerful
reality that frustrates the entire enterprise and purpose of the
framework. The imposition of the good faith obligation may not
directly result in the freeze of settlement development or the termination of the occupation. It can, however, move an occupying
power to confront and no longer benefit from a manufactured
status quo that has developed under the guise of the occupation
framework. It can limit appeals to a facilitatory interpretation
that discounts normative content.
Israeli society has long been split left and right in its response to the demographic dilemma posed by the occupation.
This is often viewed as a point of ideological departure. It has
defined elections and distinguishes political parties. The left favors recognition of the occupation, acceptance of its governing
framework, and its eventual termination in accordance with a
two-state solution and Palestinian self-determination. The right
continues to deny its status, preferencing security justifications,
and an accompanying notion of a Greater Israel. Yet when
408. Rory McCarthy, Barak: Make Peace with Palestinians or Face Apartheid,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
2,
2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/03/barak-apartheid-palestine-peace.
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viewed in collaboration with the means by which international
law has been engaged by proponents of settlement development,
and those wishing to perpetuate the occupation, this fundamental political distinction presents an unexpected paradox.
While the occupation framework is most likely to be received
by those who favor the occupation’s termination and to be rejected by those who oppose territorial compromise, Joseph
Weiler describes how the traditional framework favors rejectionists:
It is exactly here that the construct of belligerent occupation
can be manipulated. For it presents those who would wish to
retain the Territory with the preferred position: You exercise
control over the territory (as a belligerent occupant) but you
are able to deny the local citizens any political rights since they
do not become citizens of the occupying state and all of this
with the penumbra of legality accorded to this status in international law. Legally you get the land without the people.409

The good faith obligation reemphasizes the normative structure of the traditional framework. It recognizes that with prolonged occupation, the traditional framework can serve as an unwilling accomplice, but an accomplice nonetheless, to the occupation’s protraction and thus the conflict’s perpetuation. Adopting a good faith obligation to enable termination, triggered by
prolonged occupation, will begin to strip the occupying power of
an indeterminate, legally-confirmed status that permits it to indefinitely maintain an advantageous status quo. Instilling a requirement to act in accordance with prolonged occupation’s termination, the occupying power will be reduced in its ability to
use the occupation framework as a legal guise to avoid the consequences of its prolonged occupation. Facing such consequences
may prove a more powerful motivator to move towards the occupation’s termination than any codified legal provision has or
could.

409. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Israel, the Territories and International Law: When
Doves are Hawks, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL’S 50TH ANNIVERSARY 381, 390 (Alfred E. Kellermann, Kurt Siehr & Talia Einhorn eds., 1998).

